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Introduction
On December 24, 2014, Officer Daniel Johnson of the Bishop Paiute
Tribal Police Department1 received a call from a tribal member that the
man’s ex-wife was causing a disturbance at his home. 2 Officer Johnson
knew the suspect well; he had responded to eight calls involving her in the
past nine months.3 Officer Johnson drove to the man’s home, which was
located within the Bishop Paiute reservation. While en route, he requested
assistance from the sheriff in nearby Inyo County.4 Officer Johnson did so
for one reason: the suspect was not Indian.5 This mattered because Indian
tribes cannot prosecute non-Indians in their courts.6
Officer Johnson approached the suspect and directed her to leave
because tribal and state protective orders prohibited her from visiting the
home.7 She refused. Officer Johnson then tried to arrest the suspect for
violating her protective orders, as well as tribal trespass and nuisance
ordinances.8 When she resisted, he deployed his taser.9 Minutes later, a
sheriff arrived and helped Officer Johnson handcuff the suspect.10
Ultimately, she was released after her ex-husband expressed that he did not
want to press charges.11 A mine-run domestic disturbance, the event ended
unremarkably.

1. The Bishop Paiute Tribe is a federally recognized Indian tribe. See Indian Entities
Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau of Indian
Affairs, 83 Fed. Reg. 4235, 4236 (Jan. 30, 2018). Located in the Eastern Sierra Nevada
Mountains, it is the fifth largest tribe in California with approximately 2000 enrolled
members. About the Bishop Paiute Tribe, BISHOP PAIUTE TRIBE, http://www.
bishoppaiutetribe.com/about-us.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2019). Although the tribe has no
criminal code, it has established a civil law system, including nuisance, trespass, and public
safety ordinances. See Tribal Ordinances, BISHOP PAIUTE TRIBE, http://www.
bishoppaiutetribe.com/tribal-ordinances.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2019).
2. Bishop Paiute Tribe v. Inyo Cty., No. 1:15–cv–00367–DAD–JLT, 2018 WL
347797, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2018).
3. Complaint at 22, Bishop Paiute Tribe v. Inyo Cty., No. 1:15–cv–00367–DAD–JLT
(E.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2015), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter Bishop Paiute Tribe Complaint].
4. Bishop Paiute Tribe, 2018 WL 347797, at *1.
5. See id. A note on terminology: This Note uses the terms “Indian,” “Native,” and
“Native American” interchangeably to refer to the indigenous peoples of the United States.
6. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978).
7. Bishop Paiute Tribe, 2018 WL 347797, at *1.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at *2.
11. Id.
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What happened next, however, is extraordinary.12 Two weeks later, the
Inyo County District Attorney charged Officer Johnson with false
imprisonment, impersonating a public officer, assault with a stun-gun, and
battery.13 To add insult to injury, Inyo County sent a letter to the Tribe
ordering its police to “cease and desist all law enforcement of California
statutes.”14 The County asserted that tribal police “do NOT have legal
authority, notwithstanding Bishop Paiute Tribal authority, to enforce any
state or federal law within or outside tribal property.”15 The letter
threatened additional prosecutions if tribal police did not comply with the
order.16
In response, the Tribe sued Inyo County’s sheriff and district attorney in
federal court to enjoin the prosecution of Officer Johnson.17 The Tribe also
sought declaratory relief, asking the court to rule that the prosecution of
Officer Johnson “violates federal common law” and that the Tribe’s police
“have authority on its Reservation to stop, restrain, [and] investigate
violations of tribal, state, and federal law” committed by non-Indians.18 The
case settled in May 2019,19 after the Tribe’s complaint survived multiple
rounds of motions to dismiss, one of which involved a trip to the Ninth
Circuit.20
12. Disputes between tribes and local governments over tribal police powers are nothing
new. See, e.g., Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Smith, 388 F.3d 691 (9th Cir. 2004). But
the criminal prosecution of a tribal police officer is. See Press Release, Bishop Tribal
Council, Bishop Paiute Tribe Supports Tribal Police Officer (Feb. 17, 2015),
http://www.bishoppaiutetribe.com/press-releases.html#feb17 (denouncing the prosecution of
Officer Johnson as “unprecedented”).
13. Bishop Paiute Tribe, 2018 WL 347797, at *2.
14. Bishop Paiute Tribe v. Inyo Cty., 863 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2017).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1149–50.
17. Bishop Paiute Tribe Complaint, supra note 3, at 9–11, 46.
18. Id. at 44–45.
19. Minutes, Bishop Paiute Tribe v. Inyo Cty., No. 1:15-cv-00367 (E.D. Cal. May 6,
2019), ECF No. 93.
20. The case’s winding procedural history underscores the complexity of the underlying
legal issues. The district court sua sponte dismissed the Tribe’s complaint on the ground that
it failed to plausibly allege a justiciable case or controversy. Bishop Paiute Tribe v. Inyo
Cty., No. 1:15–CV–00367-GEB-JLT, 2015 WL 4203986 at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 13, 2015).
The Tribe appealed, and the Ninth Circuit reversed, ruling the Tribe’s claims presented a
federal question and were justiciable because the Tribe’s interest in exercising its sovereign
authority to detain non-Indians was impinged by the County’s prosecution of Officer
Johnson. See Bishop Paiute Tribe, 863 F.3d at 1151–55. On remand, the County moved to
dismiss the Tribe’s claims, but the district court rejected this challenge. Bishop Paiute Tribe
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A county prosecuting a tribal police officer for doing his job is a
foreseeable consequence of the confusion surrounding law enforcement in
Indian Country. Described by Indian law scholars as a “maze,”21 “web,”22
and “crazy quilt,”23 the current scheme of criminal jurisdiction scatters the
prosecutorial authority typically reposed in a single sovereign among
three—tribes, states, and the federal government.24 Supreme Court case law
and federal statutes provide some guidance, but “grey areas loom larger.” 25
The authority of tribal police to investigate, detain, and arrest non-Indians is
one such murky area.26 The Supreme Court has held that tribes cannot
prosecute non-Indians in tribal court,27 but it has also recognized tribes’
“power to restrain those who disturb public order on the reservation, and if
v. Inyo Cty., No. 1:15–cv–00367–DAD–JLT, 2018 WL 347797, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 10,
2018).
21. Robert N. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a
Jurisdictional Maze, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 503, 504 (1976) (coining the now-infamous term
“jurisdictional maze”).
22. Addie C. Rolnick, Untangling the Web: Juvenile Justice in Indian Country, 19
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 49, 84 (2016) (discussing the “web of criminal jurisdiction”).
23. Tim Vollmann, Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country: Tribal Sovereignty and
Defendants’ Rights in Conflict, 22 U. KAN. L. REV. 387, 387 (1974). Practitioners share this
view too. As an Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Oklahoma put it,
determining criminal jurisdiction in Indian country is like “solving a Rubik’s cube while
blindfolded and underwater.” David Harper, Justice Department Prosecuting More Indian
Country Crimes, TULSA WORLD (Nov. 4, 2013), https://www.tulsaworld.com/ news/local/
justice-department-prosecuting-more-indian-country-crimes/article_f66f7c27-48a9-50518bb8-54fc69302411.html.
24. See infra Section I.A.
25. Addie C. Rolnick, Recentering Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction, 63 UCLA L. REV.
1638, 1646 (2016).
26. See Angela R. Riley, Crime and Governance in Indian Country, 63 UCLA L. REV.
1564, 1633–35 (2016) (identifying tribal authority to arrest non-Indians as an area of
“confusion”); see also COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 9.07 (Nell Jessup
Newton et al. eds., 2012) (observing that the presence of federal, state, and tribal officers in
Indian country “create[s] difficult jurisdictional issues and conflicts” and that “numerous
challenges have arisen regarding the authority of tribal officers to investigate crimes and
make arrests involving non-Indians”). One final terminological note. As species of seizure,
both detentions and arrests are creatures of constitutional law. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
16–19 (1968); see also 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 3.5, 3.8(b)
(4th ed. 2018). An officer can conduct a brief investigatory stop if the officer reasonably
suspects the person is engaged in criminal activity. Id. § 3.8(b). An arrest, however, requires
probable cause. Id. § 3.3(a). Because there is no bright-line rule distinguishing the two, this
Note advocates for clarifying the authority of tribal police to make arrests, as this necessarily
includes the lesser power to conduct investigatory stops.
27. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978).
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necessary, to eject them.”28 The result of these mixed messages is that tribal
prosecutorial authority is often conflated with tribal law enforcement
authority, giving rise to the belief that tribes cannot investigate or arrest
non-Indians.29
This is no small problem. Unsure of their authority, tribal officers may
hesitate to respond forcefully to crimes involving non-Indians.30 Yet nonIndians comprise the majority of the population living on tribal lands31 and
account for most of the crime therein.32 Indeed, both the Department of
Justice33 and the National Congress of American Indians34 have expressed
28. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 697 (1990), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C. §1301(2)
(2012), as recognized in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
29. See Bressi v. Ford, 575 F.3d 891, 896 (9th Cir. 2009) (“In the absence of some form
of state authorization . . . tribal officers have no inherent power to arrest and book nonIndian violators.”); S. 1763, S. 872, and S. 1192: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian
Affairs, 112th Cong. 10 (2011) (statement of Thomas J. Perrelli, Associate Attorney General,
U.S. Department of Justice) [hereinafter Statement of Thomas J. Perrelli] (“Tribal police
officers who respond to a domestic-violence call, only to discover that the accused is a nonIndian and therefore outside the tribe’s criminal jurisdiction, often mistakenly believe they
cannot even make an arrest.”); WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 203–04 (6th
ed. 2015) (“In general, powers of policing and arrest follow the criminal jurisdiction of the
three governments . . . .”); Deborah Sullivan Brennan, Tribes Seek More Power for Their
Police Forces, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 27, 2000), http://articles.latimes.com/2000/dec/27/
news/mn-5107 (“[I]n incidents involving non-tribal members or state penal code violations,
[California tribal police] must conduct citizen’s arrests, then wait for sheriff's deputies to
finish the job.”).
30. For an egregious example, see Tribal Law and Order Act One Year Later: Have We
Improved Public Safety and Justice Throughout Indian Country?: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 112th Cong. 44 (2011) (statement of Troy A. Eid, Chairman,
Indian Law and Order Commission) [hereinafter Tribal Law and Order Act One Year Later]
(recounting how, after stopping an intoxicated non-Indian motorist, a tribal officer drove the
non-Indian to his home instead of making an arrest).
31. The 2010 Census found that of the 4.6 million persons living in Indian country, 3.5
million identified as non-Indian. TINA NORRIS ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS BRIEFS
NO. C2010BR-10, THE AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE POPULATION: 2010 (Jan.
2012), https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-10.pdf.
32. See infra Section I.B.1.
33. Statement of Thomas J. Perrelli, supra note 29, at 10.
34. Letter from Jefferson Keel, President, Nat’l Cong. of Am. Indians, to Kevin
Washburn, Assistant Sec’y for Indian Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Interior, and Hilary Tompkins,
Solicitor, U.S. Dep’t of Interior 1 (July 24, 2013), http://tloa.ncai.org/files/NCAI%20
Washburn-Tompkins%20letter_%20arrest%20authority_071013.pdf (arguing that nonintervention by tribal police in crimes involving non-Indians “creates a vicious cycle in
which the victims stop reporting crime because they believe that the tribal police are unable
to stop the violence”).
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concern that the reluctance of tribal officers to arrest non-Indians
contributes to the violence plaguing Indian Country. Although many have
called for a restoration of tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians,35
none have sought to clarify tribal police powers notwithstanding the current
limits on tribal courts.36
This Note takes up that task. It proceeds in four parts. Part I provides an
overview of criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country to highlight the
difficulty of determining whether tribal, federal, or state authorities have
prosecutorial authority over a given crime. This Part then examines the
consequences of this jurisdictional morass for Native American
communities and the effect that it has on tribal law enforcement
capabilities.
Part II considers how courts have addressed claims that tribal police lack
authority to detain non-Indians. Although the Washington Supreme Court
recognized the power to detain non-Indians as an aspect of inherent tribal
sovereignty, federal courts have treated it as an extension of tribes’ right to
exclude trespassers. That approach has led the Ninth Circuit to curb tribal
arrest authority where the tribe cannot exclude non-Indians, such as
highways within the reservation.37 After assessing the Ninth Circuit’s
approach, Part II proposes two solutions to reform the doctrine. Courts
could hold that the exclusion power is independent of tribal landowner
status—if tribes can exclude non-Indians from the reservation entirely, it
follows that they can make arrests anywhere within the borders of their
domain. Alternatively, courts could find that arrest authority falls within the
power of tribes to regulate non-Indians whose on-reservation conduct
threatens the health and welfare of the tribe. While either route would
clarify tribal arrest authority, both face formidable countervailing Supreme
Court precedent.
Next, Part III considers two available avenues to clarify the arrest
authority of tribal law enforcement—citizen’s arrest law and cooperative
35. See, e.g, Combatting Non-Indian Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault: A Call for
a Full Oliphant Fix, Nat’l Cong. of Am. Indians Res. #SPO-16-037 (2016), http://www.ncai.
org/attachments/Resolution_orvkZwEdbgGeAHMvJqyzAWvdDwRXttpGCTmoRcxCStvLS
HnXNGv_SPO-16-037%20final.pdf; INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, A ROADMAP FOR
MAKING NATIVE AMERICA SAFER 23–27 (2013); Samuel E. Ennis, Comment, Reaffirming
Indian Tribal Court Criminal Jurisdiction over Non-Indians: An Argument for a Statutory
Abrogation of Oliphant, 57 UCLA L. REV. 553 (2009).
36. See Riley, supra note 26, at 1635 (calling for “creative solutions to solve the
problem of [tribal] arrest authority” in the absence of a complete Oliphant-fix).
37. See infra Section II.B (discussing Bressi v. Ford, 575 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 2009), and
United States v. Cooley, 919 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2019)).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol44/iss1/7

No. 1]

TRIBAL AUTHORITY TO ARREST NON-INDIANS

169

agreements. It argues, however, that neither is an adequate solution. The
former hamstrings tribal police and may expose officers to significant
liability; the latter provides only localized relief and is often unattainable or
unreliable.
Finally, following a well-trodden path in Indian law scholarship,38 Part
IV proposes a legislative fix to clarify and affirm tribes’ arrest authority. In
particular, it makes three suggestions for drafting a legally-sound and
politically-palatable statute. The law should: (1) recognize tribal arrest
authority as an inherent aspect of tribal sovereignty, not a delegation of
federal authority; (2) stipulate that evidence collected by tribal police is
covered by the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA); and (3) create a federal
remedy for injuries stemming from the excessive use of force by tribal
police. While no panacea, such a statute would improve public safety on the
reservation by empowering tribal police to protect their communities from
non-Indian criminals.
I. Prosecutorial Authority in Indian Country
To appreciate why tribal arrest authority is muddled, it is necessary to
first understand prosecutorial authority in Indian Country. It is truly sui
generis.39 Generally, criminal jurisdiction is an exercise in geography; the
sovereign possesses the power to punish any offense committed within its
territory.40 But tribes do not enjoy the full panoply of sovereign powers,
38. See, e.g., Alison Burton, Note, What About the Children? Extending Tribal Criminal
Jurisdiction to Crimes Against Children, 52 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 193 (2017) (calling on
Congress to extend VAWA to cover child abuse); Ennis, supra note 35, at 572 (proposing a
federal statute to overturn Oliphant); Michalyn Steele, Congressional Power and
Sovereignty in Indian Affairs, 2018 UTAH L. REV. 307, 336 (advocating for a federal “Tribal
Sovereignty Affirmation Act”); Developments in the Law, Fresh Pursuit from Indian
Country: Tribal Authority to Pursue Suspects onto State Land, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1685,
1700–01 (2016) (proposing federal legislation authorizing tribal police to pursue non-Indians
outside the reservation if the engagement began in Indian country).
39. Indeed, this could fairly be said about the field of Indian law writ large. See United
States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381 (1886) (“[The] relation of Indian tribes . . . to the
people of the United States, has always been an anomalous one, and of complex character.”);
Angela R. Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 799, 802 (2007)
(“American Indian tribes do not neatly fit into existing legal paradigms because they inhabit
a strange sovereign space in the U.S. legal system, one which they alone occupy.”).
40. See Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909), overruled on
other grounds by W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400 (1990)
(“[T]he general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful
must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done.”); David Wolitz,
Criminal Jurisdiction and the Nation-State: Toward Bounded Pluralism, 91 OR. L. REV.
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relegated instead to being “domestic dependent nations.”41 One
consequence of this status is that the Supreme Court and Congress have
disaggregated geography from criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country and
replaced that simple principle with a welter of rules which assign
prosecutorial authority to various sovereigns depending on the crime’s
factual circumstances.
A. “A Journey Through the Jurisdictional Maze”42
1. Where, Who, and What: The Criminal Jurisdiction Variables
Determining which sovereign can prosecute the defendant turns on three
factors: (1) the crime’s location; (2) the Indian status of the perpetrator and
victim; and (3) the nature of the crime. Depending on these elements, a case
may fall within the exclusive purview of one sovereign—or two may share
concurrent jurisdiction.
The threshold question is whether the offense occurred in “Indian
Country” because only then is tribal jurisdiction a possibility.43 A term of
art defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151, Indian Country includes: (a) Indian
reservations; (b) dependent Indian communities; and (c) Indian allotments
to which Indian title has not been extinguished.44 First, a reservation is
public land that the federal government has set aside for a tribe.45 Notably,
because § 1151(a) covers “all lands” within a reservation, Indian Country
includes public roads and property owned by non-Indians located within the
725, 731 (2013) (observing that under the “traditional model” of criminal jurisdiction, “one
could determine which criminal code, which prosecutor’s office, and which court system had
jurisdiction simply by finding the location of the crime within a particular sovereign state”).
41. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831); see also Johnson v.
M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823) (holding that tribes’ “rights to complete
sovereignty, as independent nations, [were] necessarily diminished” by European conquest).
42. Clinton, supra note 21, at 503.
43. See CANBY, supra note 29, at 194 (“The jurisdiction of a tribe is generally confined
to crimes committed within the geographical limits of its reservation and, presumably, any
of its dependent Indian communities.”); cf. Fife v. Moore, 808 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1314–15
(E.D. Okla. 2011) (enjoining tribal prosecution of tribal citizens where the crime occurred on
fee land outside the reservation). But perhaps this is changing. See Kelsey v. Pope, 809 F.3d
849, 863 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding tribe could exercise criminal jurisdiction over a tribal
citizen for a sexual assault allegedly committed at the tribe’s off-reservation community
center). For an argument that tribal criminal jurisdiction should have extraterritorial reach,
see Rolnick, supra note 25, at 1673–79.
44. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012).
45. See Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFF.,
https://www.bia.gov/frequently-asked-questions (last visited Nov. 5, 2018); cf. United States
v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278 (1909).
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reservation.46 Second, a dependent Indian community refers to land that has
been set aside for the use of the tribe and is under federal superintendence.47
Finally, Indian Country includes parcels of land held in trust by the federal
government for an Indian, regardless of whether the land is located within
reservation boundaries.48
If the crime occurred in Indian Country, the next task is to determine if
either the perpetrator or victim are “Indian.” A matter of federal common
law,49 who qualifies as an Indian for criminal jurisdiction purposes turns on
a two-prong test that considers “(1) the degree of Indian blood; and (2)
tribal or governmental recognition as an Indian.”50 The first prong “requires
ancestry living in America before the Europeans arrived . . . .”51 The second
prong demands that the person be recognized as an Indian by either the
federal government or a federally recognized tribe.52 Recognition depends
on a plethora of factors, including tribal enrollment, use of Indian services,
enjoyment of tribal benefits, and participation in tribal life through
residence on the reservation and attendance at social events.53 In the
absence of tribal enrollment, which is often treated as dispositive evidence
of tribal affiliation,54 the inquiry boils down to whether the person is
46. 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a).
47. Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 527 (1998).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 1151(c).
49. The term’s origin reaches back to United States v. Rogers, where the Supreme Court
held that a Caucasian man who had become a naturalized Cherokee citizen was not an Indian
for the purposes of federal law. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 572–73 (1846). In so ruling, the Court
concluded that being Indian requires a degree of Indian descent and political recognition as
Indian. Id.
50. United States v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir. 1979); see also United
States v. Zepeda, 792 F.3d 1103, 1113 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (“[P]roof of Indian
status . . . requires only two things: (1) proof of some quantum of Indian blood, whether or
not that blood derives from a member of a federally recognized tribe, and (2) proof of
membership in, or affiliation with, a federally recognized tribe.”).
51. United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1223 (9th Cir. 2005).
52. Id. at 1224.
53. Id. Unsurprisingly, this prong is not applied consistently across the courts of
appeals, with the Ninth Circuit examining only these four factors “in declining order of
importance,” Zepeda, 792 F.3d at 1114, and the Eighth Circuit considering these and other
factors in no particular rank-order, United States v. Stymiest, 581 F.3d 759, 763–66 (8th Cir.
2009). For additional background on the Rogers test and critique of it, see Alex Tallchief
Skibine, Indians, Race, and Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country, 10 ALB. GOV’T L. REV.
49 (2017).
54. See Stymiest, 581 F.3d at 764 (stating that if “the defendant is an enrolled tribal
member . . . that factor becomes dispositive”); United States v. Torres, 733 F.2d 449, 455
(7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Lossiah, 537 F.2d 1250, 1251 (4th Cir. 1976). But see
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acknowledged as an Indian by the relevant community.55 Given that both
parts of the inquiry are fact-intensive, it is perhaps an understatement to say
that defining “exactly who is and who is not an Indian is very imprecise.”56
The final step is to determine the crime that occurred. This element has
two prongs: first, whether there is a victim; and second, if so, the severity of
the offense. As discussed below, jurisdiction may change depending on
whether the perpetrator committed a victimless crime—i.e., driving while
intoxicated—because federal law does not cover such offenses.57 The
severity of the crime may also be relevant: if both the perpetrator and
victim are Indian, then the federal government has jurisdiction only over
“major” crimes like murder or kidnapping. The tribe with which both
parties are affiliated retains exclusive jurisdiction of all other intra-Indian
crimes.58 Armed with the proper tools, it is now time to enter the maze.
2. Tribal, Federal, and State Jurisdiction
Tribal: As a general matter, tribes lack jurisdiction over non-Indians but
can punish any Indian for violations of tribal law. The prohibition against
prosecuting non-Indians stems from Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,59
perhaps the most reviled decision in Indian law.60 There, the Supreme Court
held that, like the powers to alienate land and engage in foreign relations,
Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1225 (opining that “enrollment, and, indeed, even eligibility therefor, is
not dispositive of Indian status”); United States v. Prentiss, 273 F.3d 1277, 1282–83 (10th
Cir. 2001) (holding that stipulation that victims belonged to pueblo was insufficient to prove
Indian status absent evidence that Indian blood was a requirement for tribal membership).
55. See United States v. Cruz, 554 F.3d 840, 849 (9th Cir. 2009); Stymiest, 581 F.3d at
762.
56. United States v. Dodge, 538 F.2d 770, 786 (8th Cir. 1976).
57. See infra notes 94–95 and accompanying text.
58. See infra notes 84–96 and accompanying text.
59. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
60. Criticism of Oliphant pervades the canon. See, e.g., Russell Lawrence Barsh &
James Youngblood Henderson, The Betrayal: Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe and the
Hunting of the Snark, 63 MINN. L. REV. 609, 610 (1979) (“A close examination of the
Court's opinion reveals a carelessness with history, logic, precedent, and statutory
construction that is not ordinarily acceptable from so august a tribunal.”); Philip P. Frickey,
A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal
Authority over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1, 34–39 (1999) (arguing that Oliphant “lack[s]
coherence”). In fact, in a 2009 poll on Turtle Talk, a widely read Indian law blog, readers
identified Oliphant as the Supreme Court decision that most undermines tribal sovereignty.
See First Turtle Talk Poll Results—Oliphant Biggest Frustration, TURTLE TALK (Mar. 9,
2009, 9:42 AM), https://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2009/03/09/first-turtle-talk-poll-resultsoliphant-biggest-frustration/.
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tribes were implicitly divested of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians by
submitting to the sovereignty of the United States.61 Although the Court
acknowledged that its ruling would impair a tribe’s ability to maintain
public safety on its land, it left it to Congress to decide “whether Indian
tribes should finally be authorized to try non-Indians.”62
Forty years later, Oliphant remains the law of the land with one (small)
exception.63 Through the 2013 reauthorization of the Violence Against
Women Act (VAWA), Congress extended to tribes “special domestic
violence criminal jurisdiction over all persons” in Indian Country.64 Though
helpful, this jurisdiction is highly circumscribed: either the victim or the
perpetrator must be an Indian,65 the perpetrator must have “ties” to the
tribe,66 and the statute only covers three crimes.67 Thus, while the VAWA
constitutes a partial “Oliphant-fix,” tribal criminal law remains generally
unenforceable against non-Indians.
In contrast, a tribe has criminal jurisdiction over all Indians within its
territory. The Supreme Court has long recognized that tribes have “the
inherent power to prescribe laws for their members and to punish
infractions of those laws.”68 When a tribe enforces tribal law against one of
its own members, it is therefore exercising “primeval sovereignty, [which]
has never been taken away from [it], either explicitly or implicitly, and is
attributable in no way to any delegation . . . of federal authority.”69
In addition, tribes can prosecute nonmember Indians, albeit as a result of
congressional action. Following Oliphant, the Court held in Duro v. Reina70
that criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians was inconsistent with
tribal sovereignty.71 “[I]n the criminal sphere[,] membership marks the
61. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 209–10.
62. Id. at 212.
63. See United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1960 n.4 (2016) (“Tribal governments
generally lack criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians who commit crimes in Indian
country.”).
64. 25 U.S.C.A. § 1304(b)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116–25).
65. Id. § 1304(b)(4)(A).
66. See id. § 1304(b)(4)(B).
67. Those crimes are violations of protective orders, dating violence, and domestic
violence. Id. § 1304(c).
68. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978); accord Talton v. Mayes, 163
U.S. 376, 380 (1896).
69. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 328.
70. 495 U.S. 676 (1990), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2012), as
recognized in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
71. Duro, 495 U.S. at 685.
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bounds of tribal authority,”72 the Court explained, because only members
can participate in tribal government affairs like voting or holding elected
office.73 As in Oliphant, the Court invited Congress to deal with the
fallout.74 This time, however, Congress acted. The same year Duro was
decided, Congress amended ICRA to clarify that tribes have inherent
sovereign authority to prosecute “all Indians.”75 The “Duro-Fix” was later
upheld in United States v. Lara,76 in which the Court held that “the
Constitution authorizes Congress to permit tribes, as an exercise of their
inherent tribal authority, to prosecute nonmember Indians.”77
Federal: Federal criminal jurisdiction over Indian Country stems from
two statutes: the General Crimes Act (GCA)78 and the Major Crimes Act
(MCA).79 The GCA makes federal criminal law generally applicable to
Indian Country.80 Although broad, the GCA contains three limitations: (1) it
does not cover crimes committed by an Indian against another Indian81; (2)
it exempts from federal jurisdiction Indians who have already been
punished by their tribe or where the exercise of jurisdiction is precluded by
treaty82; and (3) as a matter of federalism, the federal government cannot
prosecute a non-Indian if no Indians are involved.83 The MCA narrows the
GCA’s carve-outs by granting the federal government jurisdiction over an
Indian who commits one of fourteen enumerated “major” crimes, regardless
of whether the victim is an Indian or whether the tribe sanctions the
perpetrator.84
72. Id. at 693.
73. Id. at 688.
74. Id. at 698 (“If the present jurisdictional scheme proves insufficient to meet the
practical needs of reservation law enforcement, then the proper body to address the problem
is Congress, which has the ultimate authority over Indian affairs.”).
75. Defense Appropriations Act for FY 91, Pub. L. No. 101-938, § 8077(b)–(d) (1990)
(amending 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2012)).
76. 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
77. Id. at 210.
78. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2012).
79. Id. § 1153.
80. Id. § 1152.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1881).
84. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1153 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-25). The fourteen crimes are
murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, sexual abuse, incest, assault with intent to commit
murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury, assault
against an individual under the age of sixteen, felony child abuse or neglect, arson, burglary,
and robbery.
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State: State criminal jurisdiction is narrow in theory but broad in fact. As
a matter of black-letter law, state criminal law does not penetrate
reservation boundaries.85 But there are two significant exceptions. First,
states possess exclusive jurisdiction over a non-Indian who commits a
crime in Indian Country that is either victimless or against a non-Indian.86
In such cases, the tribe lacks jurisdiction per Oliphant, and the federal
government has no authority under the GCA or MCA. Second, Congress
transferred criminal jurisdiction over Indian territory to state authorities in
six states and provided a mechanism by which other states could exercise
this power.87 Known as Public Law 280, the statute markedly altered the
jurisdictional landscape. Participating states can prosecute minor crimes
committed by Indians—crimes that would otherwise be the exclusive
purview of the tribes. And there is an entirely different cast of characters at
play: county police, district attorneys, and state courts replace the Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA), Department of Justice, and federal judiciary. But most
impressive is the law’s reach—as of 2000, it extended state criminal
jurisdiction to nearly a quarter of the reservation-based tribal population.88
Having mapped the maze, this Note pivots to examine the consequences of
divvying up criminal jurisdiction among three sovereigns.
85. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 26, § 9.03 (“As a
general rule, states lack jurisdiction in Indian country absent a special grant of
jurisdiction.”); see also Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561–62 (1832) (vacating
Georgia’s conviction of a missionary for entering Cherokee territory without a state license
on the ground that the Cherokee Tribe is “a distinct community” where “the laws of Georgia
can have no force”).
86. See McBratney, 104 U.S. at 624; see also Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 465 n.2
(1984) (“Within Indian country, State jurisdiction is limited to crimes by non-Indians against
non-Indians, and victimless crimes by non-Indians.”) (citations omitted); cf. United States v.
Langford, 641 F.3d 1195, 1197–1200 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding that only the state has
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian who participated in a cock fighting ring on a
reservation).
87. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1162 (2018)). California, Oregon (except the Warm Springs Reservation),
Wisconsin, Nebraska, and Minnesota (except the Red Lake Reservation) are the mandatory
Public Law 280 states. Alaska (except the Metlakatla Reservation) became a mandatory
Public Law 280 state upon statehood. Id. To date, Arizona, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Montana,
Nevada, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and Washington are voluntary Public Law 280
jurisdictions. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 26, § 6.04 n.272. For
more on Public Law 280 generally, see Carole Goldberg & Duane Champagne, Is Public
Law 280 Fit for The Twenty-First Century? Some Data at Last, 38 CONN. L. REV. 697
(2006).
88. Goldberg & Champagne, supra note 87, at 697.
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B. The “Maze of Injustice”89
1. The Harm to Native Communities
The criminal jurisdiction maze has led to a “public safety crisis” in
Indian Country.90 The statistics are stark. Historically, Native Americans
are more likely than any other ethnic group to be the victims of violence,91
and in a recent survey, four in five respondents reported having experienced
violence in his or her lifetime.92 Native women especially suffer. The
murder rate of Indian women is ten times the national average in some
areas,93 and they are more than twice as likely to be raped as Caucasian
women.94 Non-violent crime is also woefully high in Indian Country.95 For
example, between 2008 and 2010, tribal officials reported 54,000 property
crimes to the FBI.96
Non-Indians are largely to blame. According to the Department of
Justice, 86% of reported rapes and sexual assaults experienced by Native
women were perpetrated by non-Native men.97 And a 2016 survey of
approximately 4000 Native Americans found that, of those who had
experienced violence during their lifetime, 97% of Indian women and 90%
of Indian men reported having been victimized by a non-Indian.98 In
contrast, only 35% of female victims and 33% of male victims reported
having been victimized by an Indian.

89. AMNESTY INT’L, MAZE OF INJUSTICE: THE FAILURE TO PROTECT INDIGENOUS WOMEN
(2007) [hereinafter MAZE OF INJUSTICE].
90. INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, supra note 35, at iii.
91. STEVEN W PERRY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NO. NCJ 203097, AMERICAN INDIANS AND
CRIME: A BJS STATISTICAL PROFILE 1992–2002, at 5–6 (Dec. 2004), https://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/aic02.pdf [hereinafter PERRY, BJS STATISTICAL PROFILE].
92. ANDRE B. ROSAY, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, VIOLENCE AGAINST AMERICAN INDIAN
AND ALASKA NATIVE WOMEN AND MEN 3 (Sept. 2016), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
nij/249822.pdf.
93. RONET BACHMAN ET AL., VIOLENCE AGAINST AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA
NATIVE WOMEN AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE: WHAT IS KNOWN 5 (2008).
94. Emiko Petrosky et al., Racial and Ethnic Differences in Homicides of Adult Women
and the Role of Intimate Partner Violence—United States, 2003–2014, 66 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 741, 741–46 (Jul. 21, 2017).
95. See STEVEN W. PERRY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TECH. REP. NO. NCJ 239077, TRIBAL
CRIME DATA COLLECTION ACTIVITIES, 2012, at 9 (Oct. 2012), https://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/tcdca12.pdf.
96. Id.
97. PERRY, BJS STATISTICAL PROFILE, supra note 91, at 9.
98. ROSAY, supra note 92, at 4.
FROM SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE USA 1
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Because of Oliphant, Native victims must rely on state or federal
authorities to prosecute non-Indian offenders. But justice is rarely served.
Understaffed and insufficiently funded, law enforcement agencies struggle
to maintain public safety in Indian Country, areas which are often remote
and sparsely populated.99 Investigations—if they occur—proceed slowly.100
In the meantime, witnesses disappear, evidence spoils, and perpetrators
escape. As a result, prosecutors often decline to file charges.101 Even when
prosecutors bring charges, the abysmal convictions rate only makes things
worse. It turns Indian Country into a safe haven for non-Indian criminals,102
deters the reporting of crime,103 and breeds distrust among Native
Americans towards federal and state law enforcement.104
2. The Harm to Tribal Law Enforcement Authority
Beyond its toll on tribal members, the status quo hinders the ability of
tribal police to maintain public safety on the reservation. Tribal police may
be reluctant to investigate or pursue a suspect unless it is clear that the tribe
has prosecutorial jurisdiction for fear that their action will dissuade federal
99. See Kevin K. Washburn, American Indians, Crime, and the Law, 104 MICH. L. REV.
709, 719 (2006) (“[A]gent[s] handling Indian country investigations often work alone in
rural settings and may travel hundreds of miles of reservation roads in the course of a week’s
work.”); MAZE OF INJUSTICE, supra note 89, at 42 (“The US Departments of Justice and of
the Interior have both acknowledged that there is inadequate law enforcement in Indian
Country and identified lack of funds as a central cause.”).
100. See MAZE OF INJUSTICE, supra note 89, at 43 (“Women on the Reservation who
report sexual violence often have to wait for hours or even days before receiving a
response . . . . Sometimes they receive no response at all.”); Goldberg & Champagne, supra
note 87, at 711–14 (finding police response rates worse in Public Law 280 states than tribal
lands under federal control).
101. See, e.g., MAZE OF INJUSTICE, supra note 89, at 66–67 (describing the high rate of
declined cases by federal prosecutors). In 2015, federal prosecutors declined roughly 40% of
cases received. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REVIEW OF
THE DEPARTMENT’S TRIBAL ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS PURSUANT TO THE TRIBAL LAW AND
ORDER ACT OF 2010, at 10 tbl. 2 (Dec. 2017), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2017/e1801.pdf.
102. See Sierra Crane-Murdoch, On Indian Land, Criminals Can Get Away with Almost
Anything, ATLANTIC (Feb. 22, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/02/
on-indian-land-criminals-can-get-away-with-almost-anything/273391/ (“Every officer could
recount being told by a non-Indian, ‘You can't do anything to me.’”); Louise Erdich, Rape
on the Reservation, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/27/
opinion/native-americans-and-the-violence-against-women-act.html (describing how the
Oliphant rule “attract[s] non-Indian habitual sexual predators to tribal areas”).
103. See MAZE OF INJUSTICE, supra note 89, at 4.
104. See INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, supra note 35; Washburn, supra note 99, at
735–40 (detailing the cultural barriers facing federal prosecutors in Indian country).
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or state involvement.105 Yet in many cases, it is impossible for the first
responders to the scene to determine whether the offense occurred in Indian
Country and whether the suspect is an Indian, the two prerequisites for
tribal jurisdiction.106 For starters, the line dividing state land and Indian
Country can be blurry.107 Tribes and states frequently dispute not just the
precise contours of the reservation,108 but whether huge swathes of land are
classified as Indian Country.109 Further adding to the complexity, Indian
Country is not static. For instance, an Indian could take their allotment out
of trust to sell it or to obtain a mortgage, transforming the property into
state land.110 Indianness is even more difficult to discern.111 As the Ninth

105. See MAZE OF INJUSTICE, supra note 89, at 42 (“In some instances federal authorities
may reportedly not pursue cases in which tribal police have begun an investigation. Officers
from one tribal law enforcement agency told Amnesty International that they were reluctant
to take steps to preserve evidence at a major crime scene for this reason.”); Tribal Law and
Order Act One Year Later, supra note 30, at 69 (statement of Jacqueline Johnson-Pata)
(“[Jurisdictional] cloudiness creates a loss of time and money, but what it also does in the
law enforcement arena, it brings in inaction because it is easier sometimes not to have those
questions.”).
106. See INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, supra note 35, at 9.
107. See Michael Riley, 1885 Law at Root of Jurisdictional Jumble, DENVER POST (Nov.
9, 2007 3:51 PM), https://www.denverpost.com/2007/11/09/1885-law-at-root-of-juris
dictional-jumble/ (“[A] change by a few feet in the location of a crime can determine
whether it’s under state, tribal or federal authority.”).
108. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 699 F.3d 235, 238–39 & n.1 (2d Cir. 2012)
(acknowledging that the St. Regis Mohawk and New York contest whether the land on
which the vehicle stop occurred was outside the reservation’s borders but finding the issue
inapposite because one of the tribal officers was cross-deputized as a federal officer).
109. See Murphy v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896 (10th Cir. 2017), cert. granted sub. nom.
Carpenter v. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. 2026 (2018) (No. 17-1107) (holding that three million acres
of eastern Oklahoma is Indian country such that the state lacked criminal jurisdiction over an
Indian defendant); see also Seymour v. Superintendent of Wash. State Penitentiary, 368 U.S.
351 (1962) (vacating state burglary conviction of an Indian upon finding that Congress had
not diminished the reservation); State v. Frank, 2002-NMSC-026, 132 N.M. 544, 52 P.3d
404 (affirming state conviction of Indian because situs of crime was not a dependent Indian
community).
110. Cf. Cross-deputization Helps Solve Jurisdictional Issues, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY
(June 4, 2007), https://newsmaven.io/indiancountrytoday/archive/cross-deputization-helpssolve-jurisdictional-issues-Aki_R6e-sUySuxyHn-TwFQ/ (“You respond to a call and if the
incident occurred in the house, it’s state jurisdiction. If it happened in the driveway, it’s
tribal jurisdiction. So it does become very complicated . . . .” (quoting Jason O’Neal, Chief
of the Chickasaw Police Department)).
111. See MAZE OF INJUSTICE, supra note 89, at 34 (“[I]t may take weeks or months to
determine if it’s Indian land or not; investigators usually cannot determine this, they need
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Circuit acknowledged, “[a] person can have significant Native American
ancestry and nonetheless not be an Indian” under federal law, while “a
person can be an Indian for tribal law enforcement purposes even if that
person does not have any of the physical characteristics associated with
Native American heritage.”112 United States v. Keys113 is illustrative of this
challenge. There, it took tribal police several days to determine whether the
suspect was an Indian after a search of the National Crime Information
Center database revealed four notations labeling him Caucasian but also
two listing him as Indian.114 Worse yet, if it is clear that the suspect is a
non-Indian, many tribal officers believe that they cannot intervene in an
ongoing crime or make an arrest.115 In fact, as recently as 2013, the BIA
reportedly instructed tribal police that they had no authority over nonIndians.116
The status quo is untenable. Abrogating Oliphant is certainly one
remedy. But, in the interim, this Note advances another, albeit more
modest, proposal: clarify and affirm the authority of tribal law enforcement
to arrest non-Indians who commit crimes in Indian Country. This Note now
turns to explore several avenues to achieve that goal.
II. Tribal Authority to Arrest Non-Indians
The Supreme Court has addressed the ability of tribal police to arrest
non-Indians only in passing. In Duro v. Reina,117 it opined:
[Tribes] possess their traditional and undisputed power to
exclude persons whom they deem to be undesirable from tribal
lands. Tribal law enforcement authorities have the power to
restrain those who disturb public order on the reservation, and if
necessary, to eject them. Where jurisdiction to try and punish an
offender rests outside the tribe, tribal officers may exercise their

attorneys to do it by going through court and title records to make a determination.” (quoting
Assistant U.S. Attorney (name withheld))).
112. United States v. Cooley, 919 F.3d 1135, 1142–43 (9th Cir. 2019).
113. 390 F. Supp. 2d 875 (D.N.D. 2005).
114. Id. at 878. Only after calling every tribe in North Dakota to check enrollment lists,
did the officers conclude that the tribe was without jurisdiction. Id.
115. See Letter from Jefferson Keel, supra note 34.
116. Id.
117. 495 U.S. 676 (1990), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2012), as
recognized in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
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power to detain the offender and transport him to the proper
authorities.118
This three-sentence exposition leaves much to be desired. Is the
“undisputed power to exclude” an aspect of tribes’ criminal or civil
authority, or does it flow from the reservoir of inherent sovereignty? Is the
term “tribal lands” coextensive with § 1151’s definition of “Indian
Country”? What acts “disturb the public order”? How long can tribes
“detain the offender” before they must “transport him” to a non-tribal
jurisdiction?
Federal and state courts have struggled to apply Duro to tribal arrests of
non-Indians. In particular, the Ninth Circuit’s approach has added a new set
of hedges to the criminal jurisdiction maze, which, this Note posits, are
impossible to navigate and undermine public safety. After analyzing and
critiquing the case law, this Part offers two jurisprudential solutions to
clarify tribal arrest authority.
A. Tribal Arrest Authority as an Exercise of Tribal Sovereignty
In State v. Schmuck,119 the Washington Supreme Court held that tribal
police authority over non-Indians is not merely an expression of tribes’
power of exclusion, but a power flowing from their “general authority as
sovereign.”120 A redux of Oliphant, the Suquamish tribal police in Schmuck
stopped David Schmuck, a non-Indian, for speeding on a public road within
the reservation.121 After smelling alcohol, the officer performing the stop
asked Schmuck if he would consent to field sobriety tests.122 When
Schmuck refused, the officer told him he was not free to leave until
Washington State Patrol arrived.123 Schmuck relented and agreed to
perform the tests, which he failed. He was arrested by a state trooper who
118. Id. at 696–97.
119. 850 P.2d 1332 (Wash. 1993) (en banc).
120. Id. at 1341.
121. Id. at 1333–34. Oliphant’s petitioners—Mark Oliphant and Daniel Belgrade—both
faced prosecutions in Suquamish tribal court. The police arrested Mark Oliphant for resisting
arrest and assaulting an officer while drunk at the Tribe’s Chief Seattle Day festival. Later in
the same year, they arrested Daniel Belgarde for reckless endangerment after a high-speed
chase ended with him crashing into a tribal police car. And who should the police find as a
passenger in Belgrade’s car, but none other than Oliphant? See Sarah Krakoff, Mark the
Plumber v. Tribal Empire, or Non-Indian Anxiety v. Tribal Sovereignty? The Story of
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, in INDIAN LAW STORIES 270–71 (Carole Goldberg et al.
eds., 2011).
122. Schmuck, 850 P.2d at 1334.
123. Id.
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arrived twenty minutes later.124 Convicted of driving while intoxicated,
Schmuck appealed on the ground that the initial traffic stop and subsequent
detention were illegal because he was non-Indian.125
The court rejected his claims and upheld the arrest. Regarding the stop,
the court found that this power was “[f]undamental” to enforcing the tribe’s
traffic code.126 In its view, a rule limiting stops to only tribal members
“would put tribal officers in the impossible position of being unable to stop
any driver” for the simple reason that “[o]nly by stopping the vehicle could
he determine whether the driver was an Indian.”127 This would “seriously
undercut the Tribe’s ability to enforce tribal law, . . . render the traffic code
virtually meaningless, . . . [and] ‘run contrary to the well-established federal
policy of furthering Indian self-determination.’”128
With respect to the detention, the court found that the tribal officer’s
conduct comported with Duro because he “detained Schmuck and promptly
delivered him up” to state authorities.129 The fact that Schmuck was driving
on a public road did not alter the calculus. First, the court noted that the
federal definition of “Indian Country” covers all land within an Indian
reservation, “including rights-of-way.”130 Second, it observed that “the
Tribe’s authority to stop and detain is not necessarily based exclusively on
the power to exclude non-Indians.”131 Rather, it “may also be derived from
the Tribe’s general authority as sovereign.”132 The court acknowledged that,
under the Supreme Court’s decision in Montana v. United States,133 tribes
generally lack jurisdiction over nonmembers on non-Indian land within the
reservation.134 But Montana carved out two exceptions to that rule, one of
which is that tribes may regulate non-Indians whose “conduct threatens or
has some direct effect on the . . . health or welfare of the tribe.”135 The
Schmuck court reasoned that detaining non-Indian motorists fell within the
sweep of this exception because “[a]llowing a known drunk driver to get
back in his or her car, careen off down the road, and possibly kill or injure
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id.
Id. at 1334–35.
Id. at 1337.
Id.
Id. (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 62 (1978)).
Id. at 1339–40.
Id. at 1341 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (2012)).
Id. (citing Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982)).
Id.
450 U.S. 544 (1981).
Schmuck, 850 P.2d at 1341.
Id. (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 544) (emphasis omitted).
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Indians or non-Indians would certainly be detrimental to the health or
welfare of the Tribe.”136 Thus, the court concluded that tribal police have
“inherent authority to stop and detain a non-Indian who has allegedly
violated state and tribal law on the reservation until he or she can be turned
over to state authorities for charging and prosecution.”137
B. Tribal Arrest Authority as an Exercise of the Tribal Exclusion Power
1. Decisions Affirming Tribal Arrests of Non-Indians
In contrast to Schmuck, the Ninth and Eighth Circuits have treated tribes’
authority to stop, investigate, and detain non-Indians within Indian Country
as an exercise of their power to exclude.138 In the Ninth Circuit case, United
States v. Becerra-Garcia,139 tribal rangers with the Tohono O’odham Tribe
stopped Efrain Becerra-Garcia and detained him after discovering twenty
undocumented immigrants crammed in his van.140 Becerra-Garcia pleaded
guilty to transporting illegal aliens141 and then appealed, arguing the stop
was per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment because the rangers
lacked authority to seize him under federal, state, or tribal law.142
The court declined to adopt his bright-line rule.143 “Intrinsic in tribal
sovereignty is the power to exclude trespassers from the reservation,” and
this “necessarily entails investigating potential trespassers.”144 Accordingly,
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1342 (emphasis added).
138. The Tenth Circuit addressed the issue in an unpublished opinion. See United States
v. Green, 140 F. App’x. 798, 800 (10th Cir. 2005) (summarily dismissing non-Indian
defendant’s claim that Creek Nation tribal police lacked authority to stop, citing Duro v.
Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990)). Additionally, the Ninth Circuit actually beat the Duro Court to
the punch, ruling in 1975 that tribal police could stop and investigate non-Indians for
violations of state or federal law. See Ortiz-Barraza v. United States, 512 F.2d 1176, 1181
(9th Cir. 1975). As in Duro, the panel opinion relied on the tribe’s exclusion power to justify
the arrest. Id. at 1180.
139. 397 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2005).
140. Id. at 1169–71.
141. Id. at 1170.
142. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 15–21, United States v. Becerra-Garcia, 397 F.3d 1167
(9th Cir. 2005) (No. 03-10654), 2005 WL 1067010.
143. Becerra-Garcia, 397 F.3d at 1175. With respect to the Fourth Amendment, the court
observed that although the Fourth Amendment does not apply to tribal law enforcement,
ICRA “imposes an ‘identical limitation’ on tribal government conduct as the Fourth
Amendment.” Id. at 1171 (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 329 (1978)). As
such, the court applied Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to determine whether the evidence
derived from the stop was admissible. Id.
144. Id. at 1175.
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“[t]he claim that the rangers lack specific tribal authority to stop vehicles
does not transform this otherwise reasonable stop into an unreasonable
one.”145 Because Becerra-Garcia did not dispute the lower court’s finding
that the rangers had reasonable suspicion to stop him, the court affirmed his
conviction.146
The Eighth Circuit applied “the rule of Duro” in United States v. Terry147
to reach a similar result. In Terry, tribal police apprehended Randy Terry on
the Oglala Pine Ridge Reservation “for driving while intoxicated, spousal
abuse, violating liquor ordinances, and disorderly conduct.”148 Unsure
whether Terry was an Indian, the tribal police called the local sheriff to
retrieve him.149 The sheriff asked if the tribe could hold Terry overnight
because the county only had one part-time deputy, and he was located
eighty miles away.150 The next morning, before the sheriff arrived, Terry
waived his Miranda rights and spoke to a tribal investigator.151 Charged
with domestic violence and possessing a firearm as a felon, Terry entered a
conditional guilty plea and then appealed the denial of his suppression
motion.152 Citing Oliphant, he posited that “[j]ust as state police do not
have authority to arrest an Indian in Indian country, tribal police have no
authority to arrest a non-Indian.”153
The court disagreed. Duro, not Oliphant, was the controlling authority,
as the Oglala merely sought to arrest Terry, not prosecute him.154 And the
initial seizure fell squarely “within the rule of Duro” because the officers
summoned the county sheriff upon realizing Terry was likely a nonIndian.155 But the court hedged on whether Duro permitted the tribe to hold
Terry overnight. Rather than relying on the tribe’s inherent sovereignty, the
court justified Terry’s stint in tribal jail on the ground that the officers held

145. Id.
146. See id. at 1174–75.
147. 400 F.3d 575, 580 (8th Cir. 2005).
148. Id. at 578.
149. Id. at 578–79. The tribal officer suspected that Terry was “probably not Indian
because it would be unlikely that an Indian from Pine Ridge would be subject to a Nebraska
protection order,” as was Terry. Id. at 597.
150. Id. at 579.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 577–78.
153. Appellant’s Brief at 8, Terry, 400 F.3d 575 (No. 04-2595), 2004 WL 2731072
(citation omitted).
154. Terry, 400 F.3d at 580.
155. Id.
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him “pursuant to the express instructions and authority of [the sheriff].” 156
Finding the detention reasonable, the court held that the district court did
not err in admitting the evidence.157
Lower courts have applied Becerra-Garcia and Terry to the seizure of
non-Indians by tribal police, but the decisions are relatively fact-bound.
One court denied a defendant’s motion to suppress in which he alleged that
his status as a non-Indian rendered his detention unreasonable.158 The court
disposed of his claim with a citation to Terry and concluded that the seizure
was reasonable because tribal police contacted state and federal authorities
after the arrest and only held the defendant for five hours.159 In contrast,
another court distinguished Terry to hold the interrogation of a non-Indian
defendant by tribal officers constituted an unreasonable detention.160 The
facts of the case, however, all but compelled this outcome—the defendant
spent two days in tribal jail before the interrogation, the officers knew he
was not Indian prior to questioning, and the officers told the defendant he
would be released afterward regardless of what he said.161
Thus, while Schmuck provides one doctrinal avenue to recognizing tribal
arrest authority, the federal courts have instead opted to ground tribal arrest
authority on tribes’ power to exclude trespassers.
2. Decisions Constraining Tribal Authority to Arrest Non-Indians
Although the decisions above suggest that tribal law enforcement
officers enjoy robust power over non-Indians, the exclusion-based approach
has drastically cabined tribal arrest authority by making it contingent on the
status of the land where the seizure occurs. This doctrinal aberration got its
start in Bressi v. Ford.162 That case began when Thomas Bressi, a nonIndian, refused to provide identification to Tohono O’odham tribal police
while stopped at a roadblock that the tribe had erected on a highway
running through the reservation.163 In response, the officers handcuffed
Bressi and detained him until he signed state citations for failing to provide
156. Id.
157. Id. at 580–81 (evidence recovered from car was lawful under plain view or
automobile exception); see id. at 582 (statements were voluntarily made to tribal
investigator).
158. United States v. Peters, No. 3:16-cr-30150-RAL, 2017 WL 1383676, at *2–3
(D.S.D. Apr. 13, 2017).
159. Id.
160. United States v. Keys, 390 F. Supp. 2d 875, 883–84 (D.N.D. 2005).
161. Id. at 884.
162. 575 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir. 2009).
163. Id. at 894.
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a driver’s license and failure to comply with a police officer’s orders.164
After a failed prosecution by the state, Bressi filed suit in federal court
against the tribal officers, all of whom had been deputized to enforce
Arizona law, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,165 a statute that creates a private
cause of action against any “person who, under color of” state law deprives
a citizen of their federal constitutional rights.166
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officers,167
but the Ninth Circuit reversed.168 Writing for the panel, Judge Canby first
observed that “the fact that the roadblock was set up on a state highway”
made things “complicated.”169 The state highway was part of Indian
Country under § 1151.170 “The tribe therefore has full law enforcement

authority over its members and nonmember Indians on that
highway.”171

But then there was Strate v. A-1 Contractors.172 There, the Supreme
Court held that Montana’s presumption against tribal civil jurisdiction over
non-Indians on non-Indian land within the reservation applied to a tribal
court lawsuit concerning an accident between non-Indians on a public
highway running through the reservation.173 In reaching this decision, the
Strate Court concluded that the highway where the accident occurred was
effectively non-Indian land because the tribe had consented to its
construction, received payment for the road from the state, and had
“retained no gatekeeping right” over it.174 Consequently, “[s]o long as the
stretch [of highway running through the reservation] is maintained as part
of the State’s highway, the Tribes cannot assert a landowner’s right to
occupy and exclude.”175
164. Id.
165. See id. at 893–94. Bressi also brought a claim under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), alleging that the tribal officers
were federal agents because the roadblock was also manned by U.S. Customs and Border
agents. Id. at 898. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of this claim on
the basis that the presence of federal officers did not transform the tribal police into federal
actors. Id.
166. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
167. Bressi, 575 F.3d at 895.
168. Id. at 898.
169. Id. at 895.
170. Id. at 896.
171. Id.
172. 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
173. See id. at 454–56.
174. Id. at 456.
175. Id.
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Bressi, citing Strate and Duro, thus held that because “[t]he usual tribal
power of exclusion of nonmembers does not apply” to reservation
highways, “tribal officers have no inherent power to arrest and book nonIndian violators” on such roads.176 But the court acknowledged that strict
adherence to this rule posed “obvious practical difficulties” because “a
tribal officer who observes a vehicle violating tribal law on a state highway
has no way of knowing whether the driver is an Indian or non-Indian.”177 It
is therefore reasonable for tribal officers to stop non-Indian motorists
because the imposition on the motorist is relatively minor and the officer
usually possesses some evidence that tribal law has been violated.178
However, roadblocks are a different story. These stops are per se
“suspicionless” and are more likely to sweep up non-Indians.179 Striking a
compromise, the court stated:
[A] roadblock on a public right-of-way within tribal territory,
established on tribal authority, is permissible only to the extent
that the suspicionless stop of non-Indians is limited to the
amount of time, and the nature of inquiry, that can establish
whether or not they are Indians. When obvious violations, such
as alcohol impairment, are found, detention on tribal authority
for delivery to state officers is authorized. But inquiry going
beyond Indian or non-Indian status, or including searches for
evidence of crime, are not authorized on purely tribal authority
in the case of non-Indians.180
Applying this new rule, the court concluded the district court erred in
dismissing Bressi’s § 1983 claim against the tribal officers.181 The seizure
was not an exercise of tribal authority because the officers “did not confine
themselves to inquiring whether or not [Bressi] was or was not an
Indian.”182 “Once they departed from, or went beyond, the inquiry to
establish that Bressi was not an Indian, they were acting under color of state
law,” and so the United States Constitution applied.183 The court remanded
176. Id. at 896.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 896–97.
181. See id. at 897–98. The court found that the district court did not err in dismissing
Bressi’s Bivens claim because the tribal police officers were not acting under color of federal
law. See id. at 898.
182. Id. at 897.
183. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol44/iss1/7

No. 1]

TRIBAL AUTHORITY TO ARREST NON-INDIANS

187

the case to the district court to determine whether the officers were entitled
to qualified immunity.184
Bressi’s special rule for roadblocks metastasized into a broad limit on
tribal arrest authority whenever a non-Indian is on non-Indian land in
United States v. Cooley.185 Cooley involved a routine traffic stop.186 While
patrolling the reservation, a Crow Nation police officer checked on a truck
idling on the side of the highway.187 The officer questioned the driver,
Thomas Cooley, about his travel plans, during which he noticed two
semiautomatic rifles in the front passenger seat.188 When Cooley began
fishing around in his pockets, the officer drew his gun and ordered him out
of the car.189 Before the stop was over, the officer recovered a handgun,
glass pipe, and a bag containing methamphetamine.190
In federal court, Cooley argued that the contraband were inadmissible
because the tribal officer had no authority to seize him. 191 The district court
agreed.192 It recognized that “tribal police have the authority to investigate
on-reservation violations of state and federal law by non-Indians” pursuant
to the tribe’s right to exclude.193 But it then pivoted to Bressi, which it read
as holding that “a tribal police officer commits an unreasonable seizure
when he detains a non-Indian on a public right of way that crosses the
reservation unless there is an apparent state or federal law violation.”194
Although Bressi did not articulate what satisfies this “‘apparent’ standard,”
the district court reasoned that, as a “carefully drawn exception borne of
practical necessity,” it was “more stringent than particularized suspicion
and probable cause.”195
Reviewing the stop, the court first found—without explanation—that the
officer “determined Cooley was non-Indian when Cooley initially rolled his
window down.”196 It then recounted the facts the officer had accumulated
184. See id. at 898.
185. 919 F.3d 1135, 1143 (9th Cir. 2019).
186. United States v. Cooley, No. CR 16-42-BLG-SPW, 2017 WL 499896, at *1 (D.
Mont. Feb. 7, 2017), aff'd, 919 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2019).
187. Id.
188. Id. at *2.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at *3–4.
192. Id. at *5.
193. Id. at *3.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at *4.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019

188

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

prior to drawing his gun: “bloodshot and watery eyes, no odor of alcohol,
possible but unconfirmed slurred speech, two semi-automatic rifles, wads
of cash in Cooley's pocket, and answers to questions that seemed untruthful
to him.”197 None of this, “whether taken individually or cumulatively,
establish[ed] an obvious state or federal law violation.”198 Accordingly,
because the tribal officer “exceeded the scope of his authority when he
detained Cooley,” the court suppressed the evidence as the fruits of an
unreasonable seizure.199
Although the Ninth Circuit quibbled with the district court’s reasoning, it
affirmed.200 The panel first recounted the “nuanced” landscape of tribes’
authority to investigate and arrest non-Indians.201 Under Duro, “tribal
officers can investigate crimes committed by non-Indians on tribal land and
deliver non-Indians who have committed crimes to state or federal
authorities.”202 But under Strate, tribes cannot exclude non-Indians from
state or federal highways, and thus, under Bressi, tribes “also lack the
ancillary power to investigate non-Indians who are using such public rightsof-way.”203 Bressi, the court concluded, was not just about roadblocks.
Rather, it “set[] forth general principles governing the scope of tribal
officers’ authority to seize and question on a public right-of-way within an
Indian reservation non-Indians and those whose Indian status is
unknown.”204 Thus, just as Bressi created law from whole cloth, so too did
Cooley: “Continuing to detain — and searching — a non-Indian without
first attempting to ascertain his status is beyond authority of a tribal officer
on a public, nontribal highway crossing a reservation.”205
Expanding Bressi to traffic stops all but ensured Cooley would prevail.
The tribal officer, the court observed, “never asked Cooley whether he was
an Indian or otherwise ascertained that he was not.”206 Here, it rejected the
district court’s conclusion that the officer determined Cooley was nonIndian based on his looks.207 “Indian status is a political classification,” the

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id.
Id.
Id.
United States v. Cooley, 919 F.3d 1135, 1143–44 (9th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 1141.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1142 n.3.
Id. at 1143.
Id. at 1142.
Id.
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court admonished.208 What the officer should have done, the court
explained, was ask Cooley whether he was an Indian.209 Accordingly, the
court ruled that the officer “exceed[ed] his legal authority as a Crow
officer” because when he seized Cooley and searched his car “he had not
asked Cooley whether he was an Indian.”210
C. Clarifying Tribal Arrest Authority Through the Courts
1. The Ninth Circuit’s Exclusion-based Theory Is Flawed
Bressi and Cooley highlight the failure of the federal judiciary to
coherently set forth rules governing tribes’ authority to investigate and
arrest non-Indians. Problems—both doctrinal and practical—abound.
On the merits, Bressi is wrong that “tribal officers have no inherent
power to arrest and book non-Indian[s]” on public roads within the
reservation because the “usual tribal power of exclusion of nonmembers
does not apply there.”211 First, it improperly conflates tribal civil
jurisdiction with tribal criminal jurisdiction. To support this rule, Bressi
cited Strate, the case in which the Supreme Court held a tribal court could
not hear a lawsuit involving an accident on a state highway because the
road was non-Indian land and, under Montana, tribes generally lack civil
jurisdiction over the conduct of non-Indians on non-Indian land.212 But the
concerns motivating Montana do not apply to the criminal sphere. Montana
holds that tribes’ semi-sovereign status means that tribes can regulate nonIndians on non-Indian land only to the extent “necessary to protect tribal
self-government or to control internal relations.”213 Circumscribing civil
jurisdiction based on land status makes good sense because the exercise of
civil jurisdiction—zoning ordinances or hunting regulations, for example—
is principally about regulating how land is used. And often the activities
that a non-Indian conducts on his own land will “bear[] no clear
relationship to tribal self-government or internal relations.”214 In contrast,
criminal jurisdiction, by definition, implicates the sovereign’s dignity and
the welfare of its members. Thus, there is always a “clear relationship”
between a crime committed in Indian country and the tribe. It is therefore

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id.
Id. at 1143.
Id.
Bressi v. Ford, 575 F.3d 891, 895–96 (9th Cir. 2009).
Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 453 (1997).
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981).
Id.
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deeply mistaken to look to Montana’s test for civil jurisdiction to define the
boundaries of tribal criminal authority.
Second, Bressi overlooked critical language in Strate that cuts against its
rule. Specifically, the Supreme Court in Strate observed in a footnote that it
did not “question the authority of tribal police to patrol roads within a
reservation, including rights-of-way made part of a state highway, and to
detain and turn over to state officers nonmembers stopped on the highway
for conduct violating state law.”215 That the Supreme Court cited Schmuck
for this proposition further undermines Bressi’s reliance on Strate. Finally,
Bressi’s rule flies in the face of 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a), which makes clear that
land status within a reservation is irrelevant for the question of Indian
Country criminal jurisdiction. Indeed, the statute explicitly identifies
“rights-of-way[s] running through the reservation” as Indian Country.216
But even taking Bressi at face value, its rule is both unworkable and
dangerous. It limits detentions occurring on non-Indian land to “the amount
of time, and the nature of inquiry, that can establish whether or not
[suspects] are Indians.”217 But trying to determine Indian status—which
turns on Indian blood quantum and political recognition as an Indian—in
the field is a fool’s errand. Regarding the first prong, there is no consensus
on the minimum amount of Indian blood to qualify as an Indian. Some
courts consider 1/8 Indian blood sufficient,218 while others require a higher
blood quantum threshold.219 Being 14/64 Native American was good
enough for one court,220 but another rejected 12/64.221 One state appellate
court has even accepted 11/256—or just 4.29%—Indian blood as enough to
satisfy the blood quantum requirement.222 Predicting the second prong,
which turns on a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, is no easier.223 The
215. Strate, 520 U.S. at 456 n.11 (emphasis added) (citing State v. Schmuck, 850 P.2d
1332, 1341 (Wash. 1993) (en banc)).
216. 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (2012).
217. Bressi, 575 F.3d at 896–97.
218. United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1227 (9th Cir. 2005).
219. See, e.g., Vialpando v. State, 640 P.2d 77, 80 (Wyo. 1982) (concluding that 1/8
blood quantum is not a “‘substantial amount of Indian blood’ to classify appellant as an
Indian”).
220. United States v. Driver, 755 F. Supp. 885, 888 (D.S.D. 1991).
221. In re Gravais, 402 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1225 (E.D. Wash. 2004).
222. State v. Nobles, 818 S.E.2d 129, 136 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018).
223. See, e.g., United States v. Loera, 190 F. Supp. 3d 873, 883–84 (D. Ariz. 2016)
(finding that defendant failed the recognition prong despite attending tribal funerals and
religious ceremonies, receiving tribal medical services, living on the reservation, and having
a son who was an enrolled member).
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district court’s conclusion in Cooley that the officer “determined Cooley
was a non-Indian when Cooley initially rolled his window down” thus
belies credulity.224 How could the officer calculate Cooley’s Indian blood
quantum or evaluate his tribal contacts on the side of the road? For the court
to make this finding, it had to assume something it dare not put in print: that
Indianness is skin deep. While the Ninth Circuit repudiated this approach,
its suggestion that the officer ask the suspect if they are Indian (and rely on
the answer) is no better. Not only does this assume the suspect will answer
truthfully, but a court could differ with the suspect’s self-assessment of
their Indian identity. In making tribal police authority contingent on both
Indian status and land status, Bressi requires a tribal police officer to
navigate the criminal jurisdiction maze each time she performs a stop.
Moreover, the rule limiting tribes to investigating non-Indians only for
“obvious” or “apparent” violations is an ad hoc and vague standard.
Consider the test’s application in Cooley. Once the officer “determined”
Cooley was non-Indian, the officer lost his ability to detain Cooley unless it
was “apparent” that Cooley was breaking the law. The district court found
that when the officer drew his gun, he had observed “[Cooley’s] bloodshot
and watery eyes, no odor of alcohol, possible but unconfirmed slurred
speech, two semi-automatic rifles, wads of cash in Cooley’s pocket, and
answers to questions that seemed untruthful to him.”225 According to the
district court, these observations did not amount to an “obvious” violation
of the law.226 But what does? The district court didn’t say, suggesting only
that this standard is “notably higher than ‘probable cause.’”227 The Ninth
Circuit steered clear of the question too.228 The lack of a meaningful
standard is doubly cruel, as it both asks tribal police to hit a moving target
while also empowering the courts to judge with the benefit of hindsight.
More problematically, the Bressi standard is sharply at odds with the
Fourth Amendment, which permits detentions so long as supported by
“reasonable suspicion,” a standard that merely requires the officer to have
“articulable facts that criminal activity ‘may be afoot’” at the time of the

224. United States v. Cooley, CR-16-42-BLG-SPW, 2017 WL 499896, at *4 (D. Mont.
Feb. 7, 2017), aff'd, 919 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2019).
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at *3.
228. United States v. Cooley, 919 F.3d 1135, 1143 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding the seizure
unlawful because the officer did not “first attempt[] to ascertain his [Indian] status”).
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seizure.229 Indeed, under the facts of the case, a state or federal officer could
unquestionably detain Cooley and search his car;230 a tribal officer,
however, must let Cooley go as soon as it is determined that he is a nonIndian. In setting such a high bar, Bressi subverts the crime-prevention
function of tribal law enforcement, effectively shielding competent nonIndian criminals from scrutiny in Indian Country.
Worst of all, courts have not confined Bressi to its original subject
matter. To its credit, Bressi specified that its rule was for “suspicionless
stop[s] of non-Indians” because of the greater intrusion imposed by a
roadblock on non-Indian motorists relative to a traffic stop.231 In Cooley,
however, the Ninth Circuit transformed Bressi into a general prohibition
against detaining non-Indians on public roads.232 If read for all its worth,
Cooley thus creates a per se limit on tribal arrest authority that applies
throughout the reservation, not just highways. As with state roads, tribes are
presumed to lack civil jurisdiction, including the exclusion power, over
non-Indians on fee land within the reservation.233 As a result of the General
Allotment Act,234 countless reservations are a “checkerboard” of trust land

229. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
30 (1968)); see also United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002) (“Although an
officer's reliance on a mere hunch is insufficient to justify a stop, the likelihood of criminal
activity [for reasonable suspicion] need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and
it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.”) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
230. See, e.g., United States v. French, 468 F. App’x. 737, 739 (9th Cir. 2012) (park
ranger had reasonable suspicion to stop the suspect after he observed the suspect “had
bloodshot and watery eyes, slurred her speech, smelled of alcohol, and seemed agitated and
upset”); United States v. Washington, 338 F. App’x. 316, 318 (4th Cir. 2009) (officer had
reasonable suspicion to detain driver upon noticing he “had bloodshot, watery eyes and was
shaking”).
231. Bressi v. Ford, 575 F.3d 891, 896 (9th Cir. 2009).
232. Cooley, 919 F.3d at 1142 n.3.
233. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 557–65 (1981) (distinguishing tribes’
inherent authority to condition the entry of non-Indians on tribal lands from entry on nonIndian lands, and holding the latter is circumscribed); see also South Dakota v. Bourland,
508 U.S. 679, 689 (1993) (noting that under Montana, “when an Indian tribe conveys
ownership of its tribal lands to non-Indians, it loses any former right of absolute and
exclusive use and occupation of the conveyed lands”); Water Wheel Camp Recreational
Area Inc. v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802, 808–12 (9th Cir. 2011) (canvassing Supreme Court
case law distinguishing the extent of tribal jurisdiction over tribal land versus non-Indian
land).
234. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, repealed by Indian Land Consolidation
Act Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-462, 114 Stat. 1991.
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and non-Indian fee land.235 As such, a broad reading of Bressi would
diminish tribal police power throughout much of Indian Country, creating
safe havens for criminals. At bottom, Bressi’s reasoning is deeply flawed
and Cooley, an illegitimate extension of Bressi, highlights the harm of its
rule. Because neither logic nor Supreme Court precedent compels this
result, the Ninth Circuit’s approach should be discarded or, at a minimum,
cabined to roadblocks as Bressi envisioned.
2. Possible Jurisprudential Fixes
There are two ways out of this chaos.236 First, courts could recognize that
the tribe’s power to exclude, and hence its arrest authority, is independent
of the tribe’s status as a property owner.237 Several sources support the
conclusion that tribes’ exclusion power spans the reservation. For one thing,
international law has long recognized the ability to control the flow of
goods and persons across borders as a core aspect of sovereignty.238 Indeed,
all three branches of the federal government have acknowledged that tribal
sovereignty encompasses the right to exclude.239 Additionally, Supreme
235. See Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 648, 650 n.1 (2001) (noting that
roughly ninety million acres of land within reservations was acquired by non-Indians
pursuant to the General Allotment Act); Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah v. Myton, 835 F.3d
1255, 1262 (10th Cir. 2016) (“[C]heckerboard jurisdiction is a fact of daily life throughout
the West, the result of many different congressional commands . . . .”). See generally Judith
V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (1995) (discussing the effects of
allotment on federal Indian law).
236. Admittedly a third approach exists—affirm tribal arrests in accordance with the
plain language of Duro. This is what the Minnesota Court of Appeals did recently after
trying to make sense of Bressi, Schmuck, and Terry. See State v. Thompson, 929 N.W.2d 21,
32–34 (Minn. Ct. App. 2019).
237. See Jeremy Wood, Tribal Exclusion Authority: Its Sovereign Basis with
Recommendations for Federal Support, 6 AM. INDIAN L.J. 197, 240–42 (2018),
https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1186&context=ailj. For
an application of this approach, see United States v. Nichols, No. CR-14-30038-MAM, 2014
WL 4185360 (D.S.D. Aug. 20, 2014).
238. EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE,
APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS, WITH THREE EARLY
ESSAYS ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF NATURAL LAW AND ON LUXURY, bk. I, § 90, at 133
(Bela Kapossy & Richard Whatmore ed., 2008) (1758) (“Every state has consequently a
right to prohibit the entrance of foreign merchandises . . . .”).
239. See, e.g., Treaty Between the United States and the Dwamish, Suquamish, and
Other Allied and Subordinate Tribes of Indians in Washington Territory, Jan. 22. 1855, 12
Stat 927 (setting aside land for Indian reservations and recognizing that “no[] . . . white man
[would] be permitted to reside upon the same [land] without permission of the said tribes”);
Roff v. Burney, 168 U.S. 218 (1897) (acknowledging Chickasaw could withdraw citizenship
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Court case law supports a broad exclusion power. In Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe, the Court recognized the exclusion power as “a hallmark of
Indian sovereignty.”240 To cabin this power to only that “possessed by any
individual landowner or any social group,” the Merrion Court explained,
would “denigrate[] Indian sovereignty.”241 Likewise, in Duro, the Court
reaffirmed that tribes can expel “those who disturb public order on the
reservation.”242 Its use of “reservation” rather than “tribal land” suggests
that the power does not dissipate simply because the offender is standing on
fee, rather than trust, land. Finally, Congress’s decision to treat all land
within reservation boundaries as Indian Country reaffirms that property
ownership does not constrain tribes’ ability to police their territory.
In the alternative, federal courts could fully embrace Schmuck’s gesture
to Montana,243 and uphold tribal arrest authority as an exercise of tribes’
regulatory power.244 While Montana voiced the “general proposition that
the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the
activities of nonmembers,” it created two exceptions.245 Tribes can assert
jurisdiction over a non-Indian “who enter[s] consensual relationships with
the tribe or its members” as well as a non-Indian whose “conduct threatens
or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or
the health or welfare of the tribe.”246 Tribes have a compelling case that the
power to arrest falls squarely within the second Montana exception. The
epidemic of violence in Indian Country “directly” affects the health and
wellbeing of tribal members and, by extension, the tribe.247 In the context of
drunk driving, for example, “[a]llowing a known drunk driver to get back in
his or her car, careen off down the road, and possibly kill or injure Indians

and banish naturalized members); Oscar L. Chapman, Assistant Sec’y, Opinion, 55 Interior
Dec. 66 (Oct. 25, 1934) (including the authority to “remove or to exclude from the limits of
the reservation nonmembers of the tribe” as an inherent power of tribes).
240. 455 U.S. 130, 141 (1982).
241. Id. at 146.
242. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 697 (1990), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C.
§ 1301(2) (2012), as recognized in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 197–98 (2004).
243. See State v. Schmuck, 850 P.2d 1332, 1341 (Wash. 1993) (en banc).
244. See Wood, supra note 237, at 242–46 (discussing the relationship between the
exclusion power and Montana generally).
245. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981).
246. Id. at 566.
247. For a persuasive application of this argument, see Brief of Amici Curiae National
Indigenous Women Resource Center Supporting Respondents at 17–29, Dollar Gen. Corp. v.
Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016) (No. 13-1496), 2015 WL 6467637.
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or non-Indians would certainly be detrimental to the health or welfare of the
Tribe.”248
Unfortunately, both paths are a steep climb. The Court retreated from
Merrion’s robust vision of the tribal power to exclude in Strate,
characterizing a tribe’s power to exclude as a “land owner’s right” that
depends on whether the tribe possesses a “gatekeeping right” over the
property.249 It will be even more difficult to cram the square peg of tribal
arrest authority into the round hole of Montana. For one thing, grounding
tribal arrest authority in Montana entails mixing doctrinal apples and
oranges, which, as Bressi illustrates, may generate more confusion than
clarity. Moreover, the approach taken in Schmuck may no longer be viable,
as the Supreme Court has narrowed the second Montana exception: The
non-Indian’s activities “must do more than injure the tribe, it must ‘imperil
the subsistence’ of the tribal community.”250 While violent conduct
arguably satisfies that test, the Supreme Court has never upheld an exercise
of tribal jurisdiction under this exception.
In sum, most courts treat tribal arrest authority as an exercise of the
tribes’ power to exclude. But because the exclusion power has subsequently
been limited to a property right, the checkerboard character of Indian
Country poses to transmogrify Duro’s simple rule into an unwieldy mess.
Given the considerable obstacles to either expanding the exclusion power or
finding a new doctrinal home for tribal arrest authority, stakeholders should
look outside the courts for a solution.
III. Existent but Flawed Solutions
There are two approaches currently available to clarify tribal authority to
arrest non-Indians: the common law doctrine of citizen’s arrest and
cooperative agreements between tribal and non-tribal governments. Both,
however, have serious drawbacks that preclude either from lifting the fog of
uncertainty.

248. State v. Schmuck, 850 P.2d 1332, 1341 (Wash. 1993) (en banc).
249. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 456 (1997).
250. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 341
(2008) (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981)).
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A. Citizen’s Arrest Law
In an effort to portage the rough waters of Indian law, litigants251 and
courts252 have sought to frame a tribal officer’s seizure of a non-Indian as a
citizen’s arrest. That doctrine permits a private person to use force to
apprehend and detain a wrongdoer under certain circumstances.253 The law
varies dramatically from state to state.254 In particular, jurisdictions differ in
what crimes trigger the arrest power and the quantum of probable cause a
citizen must possess for a lawful arrest.255 A Californian, for example,
would be remiss to attempt a citizen’s arrest while visiting Massachusetts.
California allows citizen’s arrests for a handful of misdemeanors, in
addition to felonies, and it allows arrests for felonies not committed in the
citizen’s presence if she acts with “reasonable cause.”256 In contrast, a
citizen’s arrest in Massachusetts is lawful only if the arrestee “in fact has
committed a felony.”257 Without diving deeper into the nuances of citizen’s
arrest law, the upshot is that the only arrest authorized by every jurisdiction
is one in which the private person watches the arrestee commit a felony.258
Despite the initial appeal of using this doctrine to escape jurisdictional
headaches, the costs outweigh the upside. As an initial matter, relying on
251. See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 929 N.W.2d 21, 26 (Minn. Ct. App. 2019) (noting that
the state argued tribal officer’s arrest of intoxicated non-Indian “is justified by the citizen’sarrest statute”); State v. Branham, 2004-NMCA-131, ¶ 17, 136 N.M. 579, 584, 102 P.3d
646, 651 (rejecting state’s claim, raised for the first time on appeal, that tribal officer
conducted a citizen’s arrest); Brief for Respondent at 15–20, State v. Ericksen, 259 P.3d
1079 (Wash. 2011) (No. 80653-5), 2008 WL 6194060 (arguing that tribal officer’s arrest
was valid as a citizen’s arrest).
252. See State v. Chavez, 96 P.3d 1093, 1095–97 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004); State v. KiefferRoden, 2009 OK CR 18, ¶¶ 10–12, 208 P.3d 471, 473–74 (holding tribal officer’s arrest of
non-Indian for driving while intoxicated was a valid citizen’s arrest); State v. Davidson, 479
N.W.2d 513, 515–16 (S.D. 1992) (per curiam); see also State v. Eriksen, 259 P.3d 1079,
1084 (Wash. 2011) (en banc) (Alexander, J., dissenting) (arguing that the court should
affirm the defendant’s conviction on the ground that the tribal officer’s stop of a non-Indian
motorist outside of the reservation was a lawful citizen’s arrest).
253. Arrest, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). For an in-depth examination of
the doctrine’s common law origins, see M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CITIZEN’S ARREST: THE LAW
OF ARREST, SEARCH, AND SEIZURE FOR PRIVATE CITIZENS AND PRIVATE POLICE 9–13 (1981).
254. See Ira P. Robbins, Vilifying the Vigilante: A Narrowed Scope of Citizen’s Arrest,
25 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 557, 565–72 (2016), for a canvassing of state citizen’s arrest
laws.
255. See id. at 573–77.
256. CAL. PEN. CODE § 837 (Deering, LEXIS through 2019 Sess.).
257. Commonwealth v. Lussier, 128 N.E.2d 569, 575 (Mass. 1955).
258. See Robbins, supra note 254, at 572.
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citizen’s arrest law would significantly constrain the authority of tribal
officers. A tribal officer in Massachusetts, for instance, would be unable to
arrest drunk drivers because that is a misdemeanor offense.259 And even in
jurisdictions like California, which permit misdemeanor arrests, that power
is generally restricted to “breach[es] of peace,”260 an ill-defined category of
offenses.261 Given these limitations, shackling tribal arrest authority to
citizen’s arrest law would only perpetuate the notion that non-Indians are
above the law in Indian Country.
Treating tribal arrests as citizen’s arrests would also strip tribal police of
both tribal and official immunities, potentially exposing them to tort
liability in state court. Because a tribe’s sovereign immunity shields it from
suit, a person injured by a tribal officer within Indian Country is generally
limited to suing the officer in her individual capacity.262 Further, the
plaintiff is usually limited to seeking relief in tribal court.263 In Williams v.
259. Commonwealth v. Grise, 496 N.E.2d 162, 164–65 (Mass. 1986) (holding citizen’s
arrest for DUI was unauthorized); accord Commonwealth v. Limone, 957 N.E.2d 225, 229
(Mass. 2011).
260. For example, the citizen’s arrest laws of Arizona, Mississippi, Indiana, and Texas all
contain this limitation. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3884 (LexisNexis 2018) (allowing a
citizen’s arrest only for misdemeanor “amounting to a breach of peace”); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 99-3-7 (West 2018) (authorizing citizen’s arrest for an officer or private citizen for “a
breach of the peace threatened or attempted in his presence”); IND. CODE. ANN. § 35-33-1-4
(West 2018) (permitting an arrest for misdemeanors that are a breach of peace if “the arrest
is necessary to prevent the continuance of the breach of peace”); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 14.01(a) (2018) (specifying citizen’s arrest for crimes that are “against the public
peace”).
261. Robbins, supra note 254, at 574–75. For instance, a Texas appellate court fractured
over whether a drunk driver who repeatedly crossed the dividing line and bumped into the
curb amounted to a “breach of peace.” See Kunkel v. State, 46 S.W.3d 328, 330–32 (Tex.
App. 2001).
262. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) (“Indian tribes have
long been recognized as possessing the common-law immunity from suit traditionally
enjoyed by sovereign powers”); see also Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782,
788–89 (2014) (affirming the principle of tribal sovereign immunity); cf. Linneen v. Gila
River Indian Cmty., 276 F.3d 489, 492 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming dismissal of lawsuit
against tribe and tribal officers stemming from an allegedly unlawful detention); Young v.
Duenas, 262 P.3d 527, 529 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011) (dismissing wrongful death suit against
tribe and tribal officers).
263. In the eyes of some, the absence of a non-tribal forum “means that [non-Indian]
plaintiffs have no formal judicial remedy.” Lamere v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d 880,
882 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). This view is deeply misguided. See, e.g., D’Ambra v.
Maikshilo, No. GDTC-T-10-105-PMG, 2014 WL 8662640 (Mohegan Gaming Disputes
Trial Ct. Apr. 28, 2014) (awarding arrestee over $32,000 in damages in excessive force
action against tribal officer).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019

198

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

Lee, the Supreme Court held that state courts lack jurisdiction over civil
claims against member-Indians arising from on-reservation conduct.264 The
door to federal court is likewise closed: the plaintiff cannot bring a Bivens
or § 1983 action because tribal officers are not bound by the Constitution,265
and ICRA only creates a cause of action for habeas relief.266 This generally
holds true even if the tribal officer has been deputized to enforce state or
federal law; that alone is insufficient to transform a tribal officer into a
federal or state actor.267 And even if the officer is amenable to suit in a nontribal court—say because the officer was non-Indian or the alleged tort
occurred outside the reservation—the Supreme Court has advised that tribal
actors are entitled to qualified immunity.268
Swapping Duro for citizen’s arrest law, however, would strip officers of
these protections and delay the administration of justice. For one thing,
citizen’s arrests are risky business; if the state’s law does not authorize the
seizure, the arrestee can turn around and sue the arrestor for false
imprisonment.269 And because a person effectuating a citizen’s arrests is, by
definition, acting in her private capacity, a tribal police officer who arrests a
non-Indian arguably would not be entitled to tribal immunity. Admittedly,
these concerns may seem largely theoretical given that Williams requires
264. 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959); cf. Crawford v. Couture, 2016 MT 291, 385 Mont. 350,
384 P.3d 1038 (holding state court lacked jurisdiction to hear non-Indian’s tort claims
against tribal police officers stemming from on-reservation arrest).
265. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 56 (“As separate sovereigns preexisting the Constitution, tribes have historically been regarded as unconstrained by those
constitutional provisions framed specifically as limitations on federal or state authority.”); cf.
Pistor v. Garcia, 791 F.3d 1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[A]ctions under Section 1983 cannot
be maintained in federal court for persons alleging a deprivation of constitutional rights
under color of tribal law.”) (quoting Evans v. McKay, 869 F.2d 1341, 1347 (9th Cir. 1989));
Dry v. United States, 235 F.3d 1249, 1255 (10th Cir. 2000) (dismissing Bivens claim against
tribe and tribal officers for want of subject matter jurisdiction); Boney v. Valline, 597 F.
Supp. 2d 1167, 1186 (D. Nev. 2009) (same).
266. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 71.
267. See Herbert v. United States, 438 F.3d 483, 484–85 (5th Cir. 2006) (tribal officer
was not amenable to suit under the FTCA notwithstanding the officer holding a BIA
commission); Trujillo v. United States, 313 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1151 (D.N.M. 2003) (despite
tribal-federal compact, tribal officers were not federal agents for purposes of the FTCA);
accord Boney, 597 F. Supp. 2d at 1172–81 (collecting cases). But see Evans, 869 F.2d at
1347–49 (reversing dismissal of § 1983 claim against deputized tribal officers because
plaintiffs had sufficiently pleaded that their arrest was performed under color of state law).
268. See Lewis v. Clarke, 137 S. Ct. 1285, 1291–92 & 1285 n.2 (2017) (suggesting that
tribal gaming employees sued in their individual capacity can raise personal immunity
defenses).
269. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 253, at 60–62; Robbins, supra note 254, at 564, 573.
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lawsuits against Indians for on-reservation conduct to be brought in tribal
court, and those courts are not bound by state law. But the shield that
Williams created is beginning to show cracks; at least one state court has
asserted jurisdiction over tort claims involving Indian defendants for onreservation conduct because it occurred on non-tribal land.270 This raises the
possibility that tribal police could be held to answer in state court for arrests
which occur on fee land within the reservation. And in any event,
shoehorning tribal arrests into this confusing common law doctrine will
only further incentivize non-Indian defendants to challenge their
prosecutions in state or federal court.
Finally, beyond the practical concerns, reducing the authority of tribal
law enforcement to that of a private citizen denigrates tribal sovereignty.
Tribal police are a “reflection of tribal rights to shape and enforce their own
laws” who convey “the intent of a tribal government to protect and serve its
own citizens.”271 Accordingly, turning to citizen’s arrest law relegates tribal
police to private security guards and tribes to private organizations—an
analogy the Supreme Court has expressly rejected.272 Indeed, the Schmuck
court refused to turn to citizen’s arrest law, precisely because this
“conflict[ed] with Congress' well-established policy of promoting tribal
self-government.”273 Given these many pitfalls, tribes have wisely refrained
from arguing that their officers are merely active citizens. Instead, tribes
have sought to cloak their officers in federal or state authority.
B. Cooperative Agreements
Given the confused state of the law, tribes have sought to strengthen their
law enforcement authority by entering into cooperative agreements with

270. See C’Hair v. Dist. Court of Ninth Judicial Dist., 2015 WY 116, ¶ 52, 357 P.3d 723,
738 (Wyo. 2015) (holding it could exercise jurisdiction over personal injury suit against
tribal member for on-reservation accident that occurred on a state highway because tribe has
a “diminished regulatory interest on a state highway”). Another state court recently held
Williams did not foreclose jurisdiction over a civil lawsuit brought by the state of California
against an Indian for on-reservation business activities, reasoning the suit “d[id] not infringe
tribal sovereignty” and the defendant’s conduct—selling cigarettes—extended beyond the
reservation’s boundaries. People ex rel. Becerra v. Huber, 244 Cal. Rptr. 3d 79, 86–90 (Ct.
App. 2019).
271. EILEEN LUNA-FIREBAUGH, TRIBAL POLICING: ASSERTING SOVEREIGNTY, SEEKING
JUSTICE 8 (2007).
272. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) (“Indian tribes within ‘Indian
country’ are a good deal more than ‘private, voluntary organizations’ . . . .”).
273. State v. Schmuck, 850 P.2d 1332, 1342 (Wash. 1993) (en banc).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019

200

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

local, state, and federal counterparts.274 Through a compact, non-tribal
governments may agree to deputize tribal officers who meet certain training
standards to enforce federal or state law on the reservation.275 When a state
or county is a party, the agreement is often reciprocal, enshrining non-tribal
police with the authority to police Indian Country.276
Contracting can make Indian Country safer and promote tribal
sovereignty.277 First, deputizing tribal officers serve as a potent antidote to
jurisdictional paralysis by making clear that tribal law enforcement
authority is not bound by the limits Oliphant places on tribal prosecutorial
jurisdiction. Second, deputizing state officers can benefit tribal
communities by increasing the number of police patrolling the
reservation.278 Third, compacts encourage states and tribes to pool
resources, share information, and pursue federal funding for joint efforts.279
Finally, advocates tout cooperative agreements as a means to enhance tribal
sovereignty.280 Besides empowering tribal law enforcement, these
274. Joel H. Mack & Gwyn Goodson Timms, Cooperative Agreements: Government-toGovernment Relations to Foster Reservation Business Development, 20 PEPP. L. REV. 1295,
1298 (1993). The federal and state compacting processes differ greatly. On the federal side,
the Indian Self Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDEAA) authorizes the BIA
to contract with tribes to provide services on the reservation, including the enforcement of
federal criminal law. See 25 U.S.C. § 5303 (2012). In contrast, state compacting varies by
jurisdiction. Fourteen states grant authority to tribal police to act as state peace officers upon
satisfying certain requirements; in the other eighteen states with Indian country this authority
is at the discretion of local governments. See Matthew Lysakowski & Priya Sarathy Jones,
Tribal Law Enforcement Authority to Enforce State Laws, 18 POLICE PRAC. & RES. 49, 55–
57 (2017).
275. See Lysakowski & Jones, supra note 274, at 57; see also Hannah Bobee et al.,
Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country: The Solution of Cross Deputization 11–12
(Indigenous Law & Policy Center, Working Paper No. 2008-01, 2008) (describing crossdeputization agreements).
276. See Bobee et al., supra note 275, at 18–19 (noting that of the ten tribes in Michigan
that have tribal police departments, nine have reciprocal deputization agreements with local
agencies).
277. See id. at 22–24; Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Reviving Local Tribal Control in Indian
Country, FED. LAW., Mar./Apr. 2006, at 38, 42–43; Note, Intergovernmental Compacts in
Native American Law: Models for Expanded Usage, 112 HARV. L. REV. 922, 929–32 (1999)
[hereinafter Intergovernmental Compacts]; Mack & Timms, supra note 274, at 1310–11.
278. See, e.g., Cross-deputization Helps Solve Jurisdictional Issues, supra note 110
(describing how a cross-deputization agreement enabled the closest police officer to respond
to a shooting on tribal lands).
279. Mack & Timms, supra note 274, at 1307.
280. Fletcher, supra note 277, at 42 (“[A]greements improve tribal sovereignty by
allowing tribes to exercise a de facto form of sovereignty over checkerboarded lands.”);
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agreements serve as an acknowledgement of tribes’ status as coequal
sovereigns and reduce inter-governmental tensions through diplomatic,
rather than legal, channels.
Cooperative agreements, however, are no panacea. First, crossdeputization agreements may simultaneously result in over— and under—
policing. On the one hand, they expose Indians to racial profiling and the
heavy-handed tactics of non-tribal police forces who are frequently poorly
trained and openly hostile to Native communities.281 On the other, nontribal authorities may give short shrift to crimes occurring in a jurisdiction
not their own.282
Second, deep-seated animosity and the vagaries of politics can make
compacting a nonstarter or prompt one party to unilaterally suspend the
agreement.283 Distrust on both sides of the aisle has been cited as the largest
obstacle to forging deputization agreements.284 And even once the
agreement is in place, it may not be durable. For example, in Schmuck, the
court observed that the tribal officer who arrested the defendant was not
deputized because Washington’s Kitsap County revoked its agreement with
the Suquamish.285 More recently, California’s Humboldt County dissolved
a cross-deputization agreement with the Hoopa Valley Tribe in 2015 after
several months of fighting over funding and officer qualification
standards.286
Finally, the piecemeal implementation of these agreements may fail to
strengthen tribal arrest authority. In many cases, deputization is often
contingent on the tribal officer obtaining a commission from the non-tribal
government, a costly and burdensome process.287 For example, before a
Mack & Timms, supra note 274, at 1310–11; Intergovernmental Compacts, supra note 277,
at 929–31 (detailing how cooperative agreements reduce inter-governmental tension and
empower Native communities without having to submit to costly and protracted litigation in
the court of a competing sovereign).
281. BARBARA PERRY, POLICING RACE AND PLACE IN INDIAN COUNTRY: OVER- AND
UNDERENFORCEMENT 47–59 (2009).
282. Id. at 61–72; see also Washburn, supra note 99, at 730–34.
283. LUNA-FIREBAUGH, supra note 271, at 44; MAZE OF INJUSTICE, supra note 89, at 39.
For example, efforts in Idaho and Wyoming to grant peace officer status to tribal police
failed in 2011 and 2013, respectively. Lysakowski & Jones, supra note 274, at 57.
284. See Bobee et al., supra note 275, at 13–14; Fletcher, supra note 277, at 43.
285. State v. Schmuck, 850 P.2d 1332, 1344 n.1 (Wash. 1993) (en banc).
286. See Lee Romney, In Humboldt County, Tribe Pushes for Bigger Law Enforcement
Role on Its Lands, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2015), https://www.latimes.com/local/california/lame-tribal-law-enforcement-20151020-story.html.
287. See, e.g., 25 C.F.R. § 12.21(b) (2019) (“Tribal law enforcement officers operating
under a BIA contract or compact are not automatically commissioned as Federal officers;
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tribal officer can enforce federal law pursuant to a deputization agreement
with the BIA, the officer must receive a Special Law Enforcement
Commission (SLEC).288 This requires a FBI background check, meeting the
state’s Peace Officer standards, and attending a firearms training.289 The
SLEC expires every three years, after which the officer must reapply to the
BIA and the tribe must re-certify the officer’s qualifications.290 Worse, the
BIA often takes a year or more to process an application.291 The result is
that, despite the tribe having entered into a cooperative agreement with the
BIA, only a handful of officers may be able to enforce federal law.292 At
bottom, while cooperative agreements can serve as a localized remedy, they
cannot serve as a sweeping solution to solidify tribal law enforcement
authority over non-Indians.
IV. A Statutory Solution
Congress has previously demonstrated a willingness to remedy law
enforcement gaps in Indian Country through expanding tribal jurisdiction. It
overturned Duro by amending ICRA to give tribes criminal jurisdiction
over “all Indians.”293 And, more recently, it partially closed the Oliphantgap by giving tribes limited criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians under
VAWA.294 Using these statutes as a template, Congress should pass
legislation to recognize the power of tribal law enforcement to arrest nonIndians in Indian Country for crimes committed therein. To be both legally
sound and politically feasible, such a law should contain three features.
First, Congress should explicitly recognize tribes’ authority to arrest nonIndians as an exercise of tribal sovereignty, not a delegation of federal
power. The distinction is critical. If arrest authority is a delegated
however, they may be commissioned on a case-by-case basis.”); Bobee et al., supra note
275, at 23 (“For political reasons or general distrust, a sheriff may decline to deputize a tribal
official. If a sheriff declines to deputize tribal officers, they have no authority to enforce
state laws against non-Indians.”).
288. BIA Internal Law Enforcement Services Policies, 69 Fed. Reg. 6321 (Feb. 10,
2004).
289. Id. at 6322.
290. Id.
291. INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, supra note 35, at 103.
292. See Bobee et al., supra note 275, at 16 (detailing how “financial constraints or the
personal characteristics of the [tribal officer]” make it “difficult or impossible” to obtain a
commission). As of 2017, the BIA reported that 92 of 178 tribal law enforcement agencies
have at least one officer who holds a SLEC. See Lysakowski & Jones, supra note 274, at 58.
293. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(4) (2012).
294. Id. § 1304(b)(4)(B).
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congressional power, then when a tribal police officer arrests a non-Indian,
she would be acting under color of federal law and, therefore, subject to the
Constitution’s restraints. Conceptually, this would be a significant
infringement on tribal sovereignty, as it would transform tribal police into
federal officers whenever a non-Indian is arrested. On a more practical
level, it would empower an arrestee to sue tribal officers in federal court
under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics,295 which creates an implied cause of action to remedy
constitutional injuries inflicted by federal actors.296 Likewise, because the
tribal officer would be a federal actor, the United States would be liable for
the officer’s tortious conduct under the Federal Tort Claims Act.297 In
contrast, if tribes’ arrest authority is simply an exercise of tribal inherent
sovereignty, then the officer is acting under color of tribal law; they are
subject to ICRA and liable only according to tribal law as interpreted by
tribal courts.
Congress should have no difficulty finding the right words for this task
having done so twice before. First, to overturn Duro, Congress amended
ICRA to “recognize[] and affirm[]” in each tribe “the inherent power” to
prosecute nonmember Indians.298 When the Supreme Court reviewed this
statutory fix in United States v. Lara,299 it took Congress “at its word,”300
recognizing that it “d[id] not purport to delegate the Federal Government’s
own federal power” but instead “enlarge[d] the tribes’ own ‘powers of selfgovernment.’”301 Second, Congress used almost identical language in
VAWA, which “recognized and affirmed” that “the powers of selfgovernment of a participating tribe include the inherent power . . . to
exercise special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction over all persons.”302

295. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
296. Id. at 397.
297. The FTCA waives the United States’ sovereign immunity for intentional torts where
the perpetrator is a federal law enforcement officer. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2012). An astute
observer might point out that the Indian Self Determination Act allows recovery under the
FTCA if the alleged injury was inflicted in furtherance of a self-determination contract. See
25 U.S.C. § 5321 (2012). In practice, however, federal courts have consistently refused to
find that tribal police were federal actors for the purposes of the FTCA. See Boney v.
Valline, 597 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1178–82 (D. Nev. 2009) (collecting cases).
298. See 25 U.S.C. 1301(2) (2012).
299. 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
300. Id. at 211 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
301. Id. at 198 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2)).
302. 25 U.S.C.A. § 1304(b)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-29).
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Congress should employ this same language to ensure courts treat tribal
arrest authority as an exercise of tribes’ inherent sovereignty.
Opponents may counter that Congress cannot alter the “metes and
bounds of tribal autonomy.”303 Indeed, this question fractured the Court in
Lara. There, it was asked to decide whether the federal prosecution of a
nonmember Indian following a tribal prosecution violated the Double
Jeopardy Clause, a question which turned on whether the Duro-fix was a
delegation of federal power or a restoration of tribal sovereignty. 304 Seven
Justices concluded that the Duro-fix was best viewed as the latter, and
therefore the federal prosecution did not implicate the Fifth Amendment.305
But there was no consensus over whether Congress could tinker with the
jurisdictional scheme. Five Justices thought ICRA’s “limited” alteration of
tribal criminal jurisdiction was a valid exercise of Congress’ plenary power
over Indian affairs.306 But four disagreed: Justice Kennedy questioned
whether Congress could subject nonmembers to tribal courts,307 Justice
Thomas argued Congress’ plenary power and tribal sovereignty were
“schizophrenic,”308 and Justices Souter and Scalia contended the Duro-fix
was a delegation of federal power because Congress could not reinvest
tribal courts with jurisdiction that tribes previously surrendered.309
There are, however, several reasons why this attack misses the mark
when lodged against a statute clarifying tribal arrest authority. Most
obviously, the law would not subject non-Indians to tribal prosecutorial
jurisdiction. Non-Indians arrested by tribal police will still be turned over to
non-tribal law enforcement, and non-tribal prosecutors will decide whether
to pursue charges in non-tribal court in accordance with non-tribal law. For
the same reason, the equal protection and due process concerns swirling
around in Lara are inapposite.310 But more importantly, unlike the Duro-fix
303. Lara, 541 U.S. at 205.
304. Id. at 199 (“We assume, as do the parties, that Lara's double jeopardy claim turns on
the answer to the dual sovereignty question. What is the source of the power to punish
nonmember Indian offenders, inherent tribal sovereignty or delegated federal authority?”)
(brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).
305. Id. at 210 (Breyer, J., majority opinion); id. at 211 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment); id. at 216 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
306. Id. at 210.
307. Id. at 211–12 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
308. Id. at 219 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
309. Id. at 227–31 (Souter, J., dissenting).
310. Id. at 205 (declining to consider Lara’s equal protection or due process arguments).
Specifically, Lara argued that the Due Process Clause forbids Congress to authorize the
prosecution of a nonmember Indian in a forum lacking the full panoply of criminal
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or VAWA, this statute does not purport to alter the current scope of tribal
sovereignty. Rather, it would merely codify and clarify Duro’s recognition
that tribes can detain and expel non-Indians.
Second, the statute should require that evidence obtained by tribal police
comports with ICRA for it to be admissible in state or federal court. Critics
of this law are likely to charge that tribal police, free from the constraints of
the Constitution, will collect evidence against non-Indians in ways that
would otherwise violate the Fourth or Fifth Amendment and then turn it
over to state or federal prosecutors. While a fair concern, it can easily be
put to rest with thoughtful drafting.
To be sure, the fear that expanding tribal arrest authority will expose
non-Indians to prosecutions based on illegally obtained evidence is not
frivolous. Although the Supreme Court has not addressed this issue directly,
its decision in United States v. Bryant311 suggests that evidence obtained by
tribal authorities is admissible in federal and state court even if the seizure
would be unconstitutional had non-tribal police performed it. The defendant
in Bryant attacked his conviction under a provision of VAWA, which
makes it a federal crime to commit a domestic assault within Indian
Country if the person has two or more prior domestic violence convictions,
because his predicate offenses were uncounseled tribal court convictions.312
Specifically, he argued that, because the prior convictions would have
violated the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel had they been obtained in
state or federal court, they could not be used to prove an element of the
federal crime.313 The Court, however, had no trouble affirming his
conviction: ICRA, not the Sixth Amendment, applied to tribal proceedings,
and ICRA requires that a defendant receive counsel only if the term of
imprisonment exceeds one year.314 Thus, Bryant supports the proposition
that federal and state courts can consider tribally-obtained evidence
irrespective of the Fourth Amendment.
Moreover, as a general matter, the exclusionary rule does not apply to
evidence collected by foreign officials because doing so would not serve

constitutional protections, id. at 207–08, and that the Duro-fix was an unjustified race-based
distinction, id. at 209.
311. 136 S. Ct. 1954 (2016).
312. Id. at 1965–66 (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 117(a) (2012)).
313. Id. at 1958.
314. See id. at 1962, 1965–66. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. VI, with 25 U.S.C.
§ 1302(c) (2012).
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the deterrence purpose for which it was designed.315 That is, because the
suppression of evidence in an American forum is unlikely to influence the
conduct of foreign police, courts can admit evidence that concededly would
be barred if obtained domestically. Given that tribes are separate
sovereigns, this doctrine, and its reasoning, arguably applies to tribal police
with equal force. And while the courts of appeal have recognized
exceptions to this rule, they are exceedingly narrow, offering defendants
scant protection.316
But these concerns can easily be alleviated by requiring that tribally
obtained evidence comport with ICRA to be admissible in federal or state
court. ICRA imposes on tribal governments most of the provisions
enumerated in the Bill of Rights.317 And whereas the ICRA’s right to
counsel differs from the Sixth Amendment (hence Bryant), ICRA contains
provisions verbatim to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.318 Because of
this, federal and state courts have held that ICRA imposes “identical
limitation[s]” on tribal police as the Fourth and Fifth Amendment,
including the exclusionary rule.319 People v. Ramirez is instructive.320
There, tribal police saw the defendant sitting in his car and, “[w]ith little
further ado,” searched it.321 The California Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court’s suppression of drugs recovered from the search, explaining that
“by act of Congress, Indian tribal governments have no more power to
conduct unreasonable searches and seizures than do the federal and state

315. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 455 n.31 (1976). Some have characterized this
rule as an “international silver platter doctrine.” Michael P. Scharf, Tainted Provenance:
When, If Ever, Should Torture Evidence Be Admissible?, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 129, 152
(2008).
316. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 723 F.3d 134, 140 (2d Cir. 2013) (recognizing
suppression of foreign-obtained evidence is required if the foreign official’s conduct “shocks
the conscience,” when the foreign official cooperated with American officers such that the
foreign official was a “virtual agent” of the United States, or when foreign and American
cooperation was done to circumvent the American officer’s constitutional obligations).
317. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a).
318. See id. § 1302(a)(2) (“No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government
shall . . . violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable search and seizures.”); id. § 1302(a)(4) (protecting the right
against compelled testimony).
319. United States v. Becerra-Garcia, 397 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2005); see People v.
Ramirez, 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 631, 635–41 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007); State v. Madsen, 760 N.W.2d
370, 374–77 (S.D. 2009).
320. Ramirez, 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 631.
321. Id. at 635.
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governments under the Fourth Amendment.”322 Although it acknowledged
that ICRA contains no exclusionary rule, the court held that it did so
implicitly, pointing out that when Congress enacted ICRA, the Supreme
Court spoke of the rule as constitutionally mandated and that it benefits
tribes by deterring tribal police from engaging in conduct that will hinder
non-tribal prosecutions.323 Thus, Congress need not choose between
supporting tribal arrest authority or the Bill of Rights. Rather, Congress can
achieve both goals by including in the legislation that the admissibility of
evidence in non-tribal courts is contingent on satisfying ICRA.
Third, the statute should create a remedy for injuries inflicted by tribal
police. As explained above in Part III.A, sovereign immunity shields the
tribe from lawsuits, and tribal officers are generally only liable in tribal
court for on-reservation tortious conduct.324 Yet, because this statute
encourages tribal officers to engage with non-Indians, simple math
indicates that it will increase the likelihood that non-Indians will be injured
by tribal police. Congress should therefore include a federal cause of action
against tribal officers in their individual capacity but also expressly extend
to them the doctrine of qualified immunity.
This approach sensibly balances the interests of the tribe, the non-Indian
victim, and the tribal officer by putting tribal police on equal footing with
their state and federal counterparts. Limiting the remedy to suing the officer
in his or her individual capacity respects tribal sovereign immunity and
treats tribes like the federal government and the states.325 Such a remedy
also advances the interests of the non-Indian victim by giving them the
option to pursue relief in a familiar forum.
322. Id. at 637.
323. See id. at 638–40.
324. See supra Section III.A and notes 259–65.
325. The United States enjoys ironclad immunity from suit, and a waiver of this
protection must be “‘unequivocally expressed’ in statutory text.” FAA v. Cooper, 566 U.S.
284, 290 (2012) (quoting Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996)); see also United States v.
Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 204 (1882) (acknowledging it as “established law of this country” that
“the United States cannot be lawfully sued without its consent in any case”). The FTCA is
one such waiver, although it contains a number of significant limitations. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680 (2012). The act excludes from the waiver of immunity any claim “based upon the
exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function,” id.
§ 2680(a), exempts from liability a slew of intentional torts such as assault, id. § 2680(h),
and does not extend to constitutional violations, FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476–78
(1994). As for the states, the Eleventh Amendment provides a broad shield against private
suits. See Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1499 (2019) (overturning
Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979), to hold that states are immune from suit in the courts
of other states); see also Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
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Moreover, this remedy levels the playing field among deputized tribal
officers, non-deputized tribal officers, and non-tribal police. As it stands
now, non-deputized tribal officers are reachable only in tribal court, where
they may be able to assert tribal sovereignty. In contrast, deputized tribal
officers can be subject to suit in federal court,326 and, if sued in their
individual capacity, cannot avail themselves of the tribe’s immunity.327 Yet,
there exists “no reason to give tribal officers broader sovereign immunity
protections than state or federal officers given that tribal sovereign
immunity is coextensive with other common law immunity principles.”328
At the same time, tribal officers should not receive less protection than their
non-tribal counterparts, who receive qualified immunity from suit.329
Although the Supreme Court has suggested tribal officers receive such
protections, the issue remains unsettled.330 Accordingly, Congress should
make clear that tribal officers are entitled to the same qualified immunity
defenses that cover non-tribal officers.
Conclusion
The lawsuit between the Bishop Paiute Tribe and Inyo County
demonstrates how prosecutorial jurisdiction and law enforcement authority
are all too often confused in Indian Country. And despite Duro’s
recognition that tribes can detain non-Indians, the Court’s decision to yoke
arrest authority to the exclusion power poses significant administrability
326. Pistor v. Garcia, 791 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2015) (observing tribal officer acting
under color of state law can be subject to § 1983 claim); Bressi v. Ford, 575 F.3d 891, 897–
98 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding deputized tribal officers acted under color of state law when they
cited the plaintiff for a violation of state law and thus were subject to suit under § 1983);
Allender v. Scott, 379 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1216–18 (D.N.M. 2005) (substituting the United
States for tribal officer defendants under the FTCA after concluding the officers were federal
employees because the arrest, carried out under state law, was performed in furtherance of
the tribe’s ISDEAA contract).
327. See Lewis v. Clarke, 137 S. Ct. 1285, 1291–92 (2017) (holding tribal employee sued
in their individual capacity for negligence in federal court is not shielded by tribe’s
sovereign immunity).
328. Maxwell v. Cty. of San Diego, 708 F.3d 1075, 1089 (9th Cir. 2013).
329. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (establishing the two-part test
for qualified immunity). Of course, whether the common law doctrine of qualified immunity
is legally justified or normatively desirable is a different question. See generally William
Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45 (2018). But its flaws do not
justify selectively extending it to cover some officers but not others based on their uniform.
330. See Lewis, 137 S. Ct. at 1292 n.2 (suggesting tribal employee can raise personal
immunity defenses).
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problems for both police and courts. Tribal police do not have the luxury of
navigating jurisdictional labyrinths at the crime scene; Native communities
cannot afford it.
Congress should eliminate this confusion by recognizing the inherent
sovereignty of tribes to arrest all persons within their territory. Doing so
will not raze a path through the jurisdictional maze, nor will it obviate the
need for collaboration among tribal, state, and federal law enforcement. But
it will empower tribal police and put an end to the perception that nonIndians are above the law in Indian Country. The power to protect its
members lies at the core of tribal sovereignty. In the criminal context, this,
at minimum, encompasses the authority to investigate crimes and make
arrests.
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